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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON GENDER-SPECIFIC
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF MACROECONOMIC
POLICIES
MAY 2020
SELIN SECIL AKIN
B.Sc., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., ANKARA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James Heintz
This three-essay dissertation examines the impact of fiscal and monetary policies
on gender-disaggregated employment outcomes both theoretically and empirically.
The first essay constructs a structuralist macroeconomic model that explores chan-
nels whereby fiscal and monetary policies impact women’s paid and unpaid work.
The essay discusses two factors related to labor market segregation that can ex-
plain differential effects of macroeconomic policies on male and female employment:
the labor intensity of female-dominated sectors, and different responses of capacity
vi
utilization to aggregate demand shocks in male and female-dominated sectors. In
addition, a decline in output resulting from aggregate demand shocks may increase
women’s unpaid work burden when households cannot afford to buy substitutes for
the output of unpaid care work. This can also create a labor supply constraint for
female employment. The second essay examines the dynamic impacts of fiscal con-
solidation on the ratio of female employment rates to male employment rates using a
dataset for 17 OECD countries over the period 1978-2009. Using a local projections
method, this essay shows that fiscal consolidation has a disproportionate impact on
female employment rates 3-6 years after the policy change. The impact is driven by
the effect of spending-based fiscal consolidation on female employment rates. The re-
sults are robust after controlling for the female labor force participation rate, the sec-
toral structure of the economy, and female employment shares in different economic
activities. In the third essay, I examine the dynamic effects of inflation-reduction
policies on female and male employment rates in 23 OECD-European countries over
the period 1998-2018 using quarterly panel data. The findings suggest that an in-
crease in short-term interest rates, as a proxy for the monetary policy rate, leads to a
decline in both female and male employment rates but does not show any significant
gender effect on the ratio of employment rates. When controlling for female employ-
ment shares by broad areas of activity, an increase in short-term interest rates affects
female employment rates disproportionately at the end of an eight-quarter period.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
This three-essay dissertation focuses on the gender-specific employment outcomes
of macroeconomic policies. The first essay provides a theoretical model that sheds
light on the various channels through which macroeconomic policies differentially
impact employment outcomes for women and men, while the second and third essays
present an empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal and monetary policies on women’s
and men’s employment. Although fiscal policy and monetary policy are implemented
concurrently, their tools and mechanisms are different, and they can lead to different
gender implications on employment. I therefore explore fiscal and monetary policies
in separate essays.
Macroeconomic policies, specifically fiscal and monetary policies, affect various
areas of the economy, including labor market outcomes and non-market work. The
consequences of these policies often are not the same for women and men. Specifi-
cally, differences can arise in both paid work and non-market work through channels
affecting labor demand and supply. These include labor market segregation, the
gender division of labor, and various labor supply dynamics. With regard to paid
employment, women and men are concentrated in different sectors and occupations.
Men do more paid work, while non-market work is mostly done by women.
The first essay builds a gender-aware macroeconomic model to analyze the impact
of fiscal and monetary policies on gender-disaggregated employment outcomes. The
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model considers both paid and unpaid work of women to incorporate gender aspects
into a structuralist macroeconomic model. There are two mechanisms that explain
different effects of macroeconomic policies on female and male employment rates;
the labor intensity of a female-dominated sector, and different capacity utilization
responses to aggregate demand shocks in female and male-dominated sectors. In
addition, women’s unpaid work burden may rise as a response to contractionary
policies because the household cannot buy substitutes for the output of unpaid care
work, which has a potential to create a labor supply shortage for female employment.
In the second essay, I examine the dynamic impact of fiscal consolidation on gen-
der disaggregated employment rates in 17 OECD countries over the period 1978-2009
with a dataset that identifies discretionary fiscal consolidation. Findings suggest that
discretionary fiscal consolidation, motivated by the goal of reducing budget deficits,
has a disproportionate impact on female employment, which is stronger between 3-6
years after fiscal consolidation. The impact is higher when the fiscal consolidation
is spending-based, rather than tax-based. The results are robust to inclusion of spe-
cific control variables: female labor force participation rate, sectoral structure of the
country, and female employment shares in different economic activities.
In the third essay, I explore the dynamic effects of inflation reduction policies on
female and male employment rates, as well as their ratio for 23 OECD-European
countries. I use two empirical strategies. First, I look at the impact of short-term
interest rates as a proxy of monetary policy interest rate. Second, I examine employ-
ment changes during inflation reduction episodes. The results show that short-term
interest rates have negative impacts on female and male employment rates; how-
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ever, the difference between the effects are not statistically significant. If female
employment shares by broadly defined economic activities are kept constant, short-
term interest rates affect female employment rates more than male employment rates
eight quarters after the policy change.
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CHAPTER 1
A STRUCTURALIST MACROECONOMIC MODEL
ABOUT GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
1.1 Introduction
This essay presents a theoretical model that explores the impact of monetary
and fiscal policies on gender disaggregated employment outcomes. While there ex-
ists an empirical literature on the gendered impact of macroeconomic policies (Abell,
1991; Braunstein and Heintz, 2006; Takhtamanova and Sierminska, 2009; Seguino and
Heintz, 2010; Ortiz and Cummins, 2013; Braunstein and Seguino, 2018), I analyze
this research question with a gender disaggregated macroeconomic model. The theo-
retical model sheds light on the various mechanisms and channels whereby macroeco-
nomic policies have distinct employment outcomes for women and men. The model-
ing exercise shows how these outcomes depend on structural features of the economy
and would generate a number of testable hypotheses. Even though it is an important
part of gender analysis, few scholars have analyzed care work in a macroeconomic
model, exceptions include Braunstein et al. (2011). It is essential to include care
activities in a structuralist macro model to consider implications of both fiscal and
monetary policies on female employment.
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The main objective of this paper is to show how and by which mechanisms mone-
tary and fiscal policies can affect employment outcomes for women disproportionately
using macroeconomic modeling. This paper focuses on two factors that yield differ-
ential impacts of fiscal and monetary policies on female and male employment rates:
labor intensity of the female-dominated sector and different capacity utilization rates
in female and male sectors. In addition, macroeconomic policies also have an effect on
the unpaid work time of women. When aggregate demand shocks squeeze household
budget, women do more unpaid work because they cannot afford to buy substitutes
of unpaid work. This has the potential to create a labor supply constraint for female
employment.
I use the model developed in this essay to motivate my other research projects
which analyze the impact of macroeconomic policies on gender disaggregated em-
ployment empirically. The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section
2, I present the related literature review. I combine the literature on structuralist
macroeconomics and feminist economics. I also discuss research questions, my hy-
pothesis and the specific contributions of this paper. In Section 3, I construct a
gender-disaggregated structuralist macroeconomic model. In Section 4, I show the
effect of an aggregate demand shock on female and male employment rates. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
In this essay, I develop a model that analyzes the effects of fiscal and monetary
policies on gender specific employment rates by using a gender-aware macroeconomic
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model. In addition to including gender disaggregated variables to macroeconomic
models, a gender-aware approach also addresses gender dynamics in both market
and non-market work by using macroeconomic tools. Before discussing the litera-
ture on the specific topic, I present an overview of the literature on gender-aware
macroeconomic models. The inclusion of gender in macroeconomic models is still
evolving. The literature can be classified into two broad categories: studies that
mention the importance of gender-macro modeling, and those which include gender
in macroeconomic models. There is a significant body of work examining the first
issue, but studies addressing the second issue are still limited. Examples of gender-
macro modeling literature are Cagatay et al. (1995); Elson (1995a); Beneria (1995);
Fontana (2014); Cozzi and Bargawi (2015).
The literature discusses why a gender-aware macro modeling approach is useful
to address problems in gender and macroeconomics field. Articles in the 1995 special
issue of World Development (volume 23, issue 11) discusses gender aware macroeco-
nomic analysis in details. Cagatay et al. (1995) discuss three important aspects of
macroeconomic models with regard to feminist economics. First, models are helpful
to interpret the direction and size of an effect. Second, they are a good way to com-
municate with mainstream economists. Finally, they have significant implications
for policy making. Cagatay et al. (1995) discuss four approaches to gender-aware
macroeconomic modeling: the gender disaggregation model, the gendered macroeco-
nomic variable method, the two sector/system method, and the combined method.
Elson (1995a, 1851-1852) discusses three strategies for gender-aware models; disag-
gregating at least a variable in terms of gender, identifying the economy from women’s
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viewpoint, and conceptualizing a gender structured economy. Beneria (1995) stresses
the importance of building a model from a gender perspective, and discusses some
suggestions for such an approach, including hidden costs that are ignored in most
macroeconomic models. These approaches to developing a macroeconomic model
from a gender perspective can identify both short term and long term social policy
measures to decrease the negative effects of economic policies, such as structural
adjustment or austerity policies. Ideally, macro models should link paid and unpaid
work, and productive and reproductive activities. This approach should be aware
that technological change maybe gender biased. It should also consider that feminist
concerns and macroeconomic objectives interact (Beneria, 1995, 1846-1848).
There are different ways to adopt a gender-aware approach to macro-modeling.
Fontana (2014) stresses the importance of generating gender awareness in the field of
macro-modeling, and discusses two main approaches in CGGE (computable gender
general equilibrium models): GD approach (the ‘gender disaggregation school’) and
2S approach (the ‘two systems’ school). GD approach focuses on the differences
between men and women in the labor market while 2S approach also addresses unpaid
reproductive activities. Fontana (2014) considers 2S models to be superior to GD
models in terms of a feminist policy agenda because they take unpaid work into
account, and stress the unequal burden of it on women. That being said, 2S models
also have limitations: ‘the absence of a mechanism for representing the complete
range of feedback effects between the market and the non-market sphere’ (Fontana,
2014, p. 168). Fontana (2014, p. 174) concludes that further research should stress
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distinguishing different types of unpaid care activities, and the interconnection of
care activities with the market sphere.
In my research, I focus on short-run macroeconomic relationships while longer
term gender analysis is also available in the macro-modeling literature. Cozzi and
Bargawi (2015) make a contribution using The Cambridge-Alphametrics Model,
which provides a medium- to long-term perspective. They focus on two alternative
scenarios: an austerity scenario and a gendered expansionary macroeconomic sce-
nario. They make this comparison in Core Eurozone countries (Austria, Germany,
Belgium, France, Luxemburg and The Netherlands), Eurozone Periphery countries
(Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece), and the United Kingdom. They con-
clude that if gender-sensitive expansionary macroeconomic policies -instead of aus-
terity policies - are applied, both economic growth and male and female employment
increase. These policies would also reduce the employment gender wage gap between
women and men.
I contribute to this literature by focusing on the gender aspect of the short run
structuralist macroeconomic model. The structuralist macroeconomic approach has
its foundation in non-mainstream economics such as Keynesian, Kaleckian, Ricar-
dian, and Marxian traditions. The main idea is that social groups as well as dis-
tributional and institutional relationhips play important roles for macro behavior.
Therefore, these approaches focus on institutions such as households, and govern-
ment more than individual agents (Taylor, 2004, p.1-2). Structuralist macroeconomic
models; such as in Dutt (1984); Taylor (1990); Marglin and Bhaduri (1992), consider
the role of income distribution to explain macroeconomic outcomes. Taylor (1990)
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states that wage-cutting may respond counterproductively to the policy questions,
regarding the effects on inflation and output, in developing countries. He examines
semi-industrialized stylized facts and institutions to decide which casual relations
on simple macroeconomic models fit the best. In his ‘closed-economy macroeco-
nomic relationships’ model, Taylor (1990) starts with Kalecki’s (1971) model of out-
put adjustment in an economy closed to trade, then continue with the extension of
Rowthorn (1982) and Dutt (1984) to show the impact of the real wage on output,
the profit rate and growth.
As mentioned in Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer (2008), structuralist and Post Key-
nesian macroeconomic models are useful in several ways when extending the model
to incorporate gender dynamics. First, it is possible to incorporate heterogenous
variables into the model. This makes it possible to include gender disaggregated
sectors, labor, and wages etc. Second, it allows models to have different domains;
market and state or as in Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer (2008) a household sector. Fi-
nally, structuralist and post Keynesian economics are concerned about the issues of
economic growth and distributional relationships. In the gender-aware macroeco-
nomic model case, we can analyze the different distributional outcomes for female
and male workers in addition to the distributional relationship between capitalists
and workers.
There are some attempts in the literature to use a structuralist macro model that
includes gender relations; Erturk and Cagatay (1995); Braunstein (2000); Blecker and
Seguino (2002); Seguino (2010); Braunstein et al. (2011); Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer
(2008). These papers explain macroeconomic research questions by drawing attention
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to differences between men and women in the labor market and within households.
I also analyze a macroeconomic question in a similar setting with gender disaggre-
gated variables, and considering gender inequality in the labor market and household
production. Erturk and Cagatay (1995) research the macroeconomic implications of
two outcomes of structural adjustment policies; the feminization of the labor force
in the market sphere, and the intensification of female labor use in the reproductive
sector. They analyze this question by building a dynamic Keynesian model. Their
results show that more developed countries are more likely to experience recovery
through feminization.
Women’s bargaining power at home affects macroeconomic outcomes for women
in the labor market. Braunstein (2000) develops a model that includes both a family
structure and structural macroeconomic relations. She examines how international
capital mobility affects female wages and employment. The results show that in
case of low capital mobility, a rise in women’s bargaining power relative to capital
improves macroeconomic outcomes and women’s wage and employment. In the high
capital mobility situation, this improvement in women’s bargaining power relative
to capital may decrease output. However, a rise in female autonomy from men can
increase output.
Gender disaggregated variables in a macroeconomic model are useful to identify
distinct effects on labor market outcomes for women and men. Blecker and Seguino
(2002) provide two short run structuralist models. There are two sectors, produc-
ing home and export products, and the export sector is female-intensive. In the first
model, wages are exogenous, and the exchange rate is constant. In the second model,
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the female-male wage ratio and the real exchange rate are endogenous. They discuss
the conditions that can improve gender equality for female workers in export sector
without threatening growth and employment. In the first model, an exogenous in-
crease in female wages do not reduce employment; on the other hand, it may even
increase the employment in some circumstances (in cases of ‘a relatively low price
elasticity of exports; a high elasticity of price cost margins with respect to interna-
tional competitive pressures in the export sector; a wide gap between the marginal
propensities to consume out of wage and profit income; and relatively large domestic
consumption of the export good’ (Blecker and Seguino, 2002, 116)). In the second
model, different short run dynamic outcomes are possible.
Gender equality might affect outcomes of macroeconomic changes. Seguino (2010)
examines the impact of gender equality on the balance of payments constraint to
growth in semi-industrialized countries and low-income agricultural economies in
both the short and the long run. The results show that, in the short run, gender
equality worsens the balance of payment in semi-industrialized countries, and en-
hances it in low-income agricultural economies. In the long run, government action
is required to improve both equality and growth.
Having gender disaggregated two sectors in the model makes it easier to inter-
pret the differences between female-dominated and male-dominated sectors. Akram-
Lodhi and Hanmer (2008) integrate gender relations into a Post Keynesian two-sector
macroeconomic model to examine the dynamic relationship between household pro-
duction and commodity production. They use structuralist and Post Keynesian
methodology by taking household domain into account. Their analysis show that
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investment in household production is essential to improve standard of living, which
supports the argument of the importance of unpaid care work for economic develop-
ment.
Gender equality in performing unpaid work might affect market activities in
gender disaggregated sectors. Braunstein et al. (2011) incorporate gender into a
structuralist macroeconomic model considering both paid and unpaid work. They
compare care work and labor market relationships in a ‘selfish’ and ‘altruistic’ econ-
omy. Their main contribution is to add care work into a structuralist macroeconomic
model. In this model, both men and women are involved in both paid and unpaid
work (with a larger extent of women performing unpaid care). They follow Marglin
and Bhaduri’s (1990) demand-side structuralist model. They consider three different
spheres in the supply side: the labor market, the product market, and the production
of human capacities in the household sector. There is a ‘female sector’ and a ‘male
sector’ in the model. Women work in the service sector which produces substitutes
for unpaid care. Men work in a durable goods industry which produces physical
investment goods which complement care work. In the model, altruistic economies
have a lower profit share but higher output. Their results show that more gender
equality leads to more efficiency gains with regard to market activities in an altruistic
economy, which is not the case in a selfish economy.
Non-market production should be considered as well as market dynamics to ex-
amine gender aspects of macroeconomic relationships. Folbre and Heintz (2017)
focuses on the integration of family and market dynamics in macroeconomic models.
They compare accounting framework, neoclassical growth models that assumes joint
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utility and overlapping generation models. Their investigation of accounting models
provides a useful framework for incorporating non-market work. Non-market output
of household services is not counted in GDP; however, efforts to assign a monetary
value to unpaid, non-market production find that such activities represent a value
equal to a significant percentage of GDP (Folbre and Heintz, 2017, p.115). This
suggests that some forms of non-market production, supported by transfers from
households and the state should be counted as investment (Folbre and Heintz, 2017,
p.116).
According to the extended social accounting matrix that Folbre and Heintz (2017)
elaborate, we can think of two types of household activities; household market activ-
ities and household non-market activities. In this social accounting model, there are
transfers from firms to household market activities (Wm) and government (Tf ); from
household market activities to firms (Cm), household non-market activities (Ch),
government (Tm), and net investment (Shm); from household non-market activities
to household market activities (Wh) and net investment (Shh); from government to
firms (Gf ), household market activities (Gh), and net investment (Sg); from net in-
vestment to firms (If ), household market activities(Im), and household non-market
activities(Ih) (Folbre and Heintz, 2017, p.117). Although the model developed in
this essay could incorporate these relationships, for simplicity and to focus only on
the policy questions, the full range of these kinds of transfers are not included in this
model. Instead, I selectively consider some of these transfers.
A gender disaggregated macro model should ideally incorporate both market work
and non-market work. Women contribute to non-market household activities more
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than men because they are the main providers of care. As a simplifying assumption,
within the model presented here, all of the output produced by the unpaid sector
represents investments in human capital. I adapt the approach of Folbre and Heintz
(2017) in terms of considering transfers from household non-market activities to
household market activities as well as transfers from household market activities to
household non-market activities.
Macroeconomic policy shocks affect female paid and unpaid work through several
mechanisms representing both demand and supply sides. Within my model, the
three channels that explain the disproportionate negative impact on women’s work
are labor market segregation, gender division of labor, and labor supply dynamics.
Labor market segregation and occupational segregation usually put women in either
public sector, service sector or more precarious forms of employment. Aggregate
demand shocks might affect some sectors more than others. In some cases, these
can be male-dominated sectors such as construction; in other cases, these can be
female-dominated sectors such as service sector or public sector. Although it is not
specifically modeled here, cuts in government spendings can affect women more since
they heavily work in public sector.
In addition to the difference between women and men in the labor market, unpaid
work constitutes a significant source of gender inequality that affect the distributive
consequences of macroeconomic policies. With the gender division of labor, women
are concentrated in unpaid work while men are concentrated in paid employment.
Women may act as a reserve army with regard to supplying labor to the market econ-
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omy. A fuller consideration of gender in a macroeconomic model should incorporate
these dynamics of unpaid work.
Through labor market dynamics, macroeconomic policies that squeeze household
resources can affect women’s labor supply and paid employment. There are two
possible outcomes. It may increase paid employment of women if women enter the
labor force to compensate for lost market income or it may decrease paid employment
of women if women withdraw to focus on unpaid household work. In this model, I will
try to show which one of those channels influence the size and direction of changes
in the allocation of women’s labor.
Using the model developed here, this essay attempts to explore a number of
questions. Do contractionary fiscal and monetary policies have different employment
outcomes for women and men? How does male and female employment react to a
change in output differently? How does the change in unpaid work contribute to
this? How is unpaid work affected from the policy change? The model’s outcomes
suggest that the same level of decrease in output across sectors will lead to higher
employment loss in female sector because female sector is more labor intensive; that
different responses of capacity utilization to shifts in aggregate demand can explain
disproportionate gender employment effects; and that a decline in market output as a
result aggregate demand shocks can increase the unpaid work time for women when
households cannot afford paid care services. Spending more time in unpaid work
could have an indirect effect on paid work if it results in insufficient labor supply to
the market economy.
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1.3 A Gender Aware Structuralist Macroeconomic Model
I build the model on previous structuralist macroeconomic models in the lit-
erature (Taylor, 1990; Braunstein et al., 2011; Dutt, 1984). The model considers
the closed economy macroeconomic relationships with gender disaggregated output,
wage and employment rates. There are two sectors in the market economy; a fe-
male intensive sector, and male intensive sector. Capital, market output, and paid
labor are divided between sectors. For simplicity, female intensive sector only em-
ploys women, and male intensive sector only employs men. Because it is a short run
model, capital is not mobile between sectors, and technology is fixed. The female
sector’s output and the male sector’s output (Yf , Ym) represent the output of paid
employment. I assume that the female intensive sector is more labor intensive. In
addition, women supply labor to unpaid care activities in the household.
In the model, women do all unpaid work to draw attention to women’s burden
of unpaid work, and how this burden can have a role in the impact of macroeco-
nomic policies 1. The amount of unpaid work that men and women do can change
in different country contexts but the literature provides evidence that women con-
tributes to household work and care work more than men (Galvez-Munoz et al., 2011;
Sevilla-Sanz et al., 2010; Kizilirmak and Memis, 2009; Hartmann et al., 2010; Berik
and Kongar, 2011, 2012). While there is a significant gender gap in time spent for
unpaid work, this gap may narrow at times for example during recessions. However,
even in these cases the decline in the gap is not very large, and on average women still
1It is also possible to extend the model in a way that includes men’s unpaid work. However, for
the purpose of this study, men’s unpaid work is not included.
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do larger part of unpaid work. In these cases, the time that men spend on unpaid
work does not necessarily increase significantly. For example, the decline in the gen-
der gap was driven by the decline in women’s unpaid work in the US during the Great
Recession, and during the post-recession period it returned to its pre-recession pat-
terns (Kongar and Berik, 2014; Berik and Kongar, 2012, 2011). Even though men
are expected to do more unpaid work when they are unemployed, the increase in
their time spent in unpaid work is still less than women in most cases. The litera-
ture on different county examples provides similar results. Individual unemployment
increases women’s unpaid work a lot more than men’s unpaid work, and both em-
ployed and unemployed women do more unpaid work than their male counterparts
in the US (Hartmann et al., 2010; Berik and Kongar, 2011). Women’s paid work has
a very little effect on men’s unpaid work in Spain (Carrasco and Dominguez, 2011).
Equation 1.1 shows the labor output relationship in the male sector where b is
the labor output ratio in this sector, Lm is male employment, and Ym represents
market output of this sector. Labor in male sector and output in male sector are
positively correlated so when output increases labor is also increasing. The female
dominated sector is more labor intensive so the labor-output ratio, c, is higher than
the labor-output ratio in the male sector, b. The relationship between female paid
employment, LF , the productivity parameter c, and market output of this sector, Yf ,
is presented in Equation 1.2. Since female market output is less than male output,
female employment is lower than male employment. Therefore even though c is
higher than b, female employment still falls below male’s. Because of differences in
labor intensity, female labor is more responsive to changes in output in the female
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sector than male labor responsiveness to output in the male sector.
Lm = bYm (1.1)
Lf = cYf (1.2)
This model considers a household with a female and a male member to show the
gender differences in employment and unpaid work. Women in all household perform
the same amount of care work. For simplicity, this model does not consider different
types of care work, and only women do unpaid care work2. Women divide their time
between paid and unpaid work. Women’s unpaid work decreases with income. After
sleep and personal care, the maximum hours that can be devoted to (unpaid) work
is given by the variable H. However, even if women have a full-time job, they still do
a minimum amount of household work. U is the minimum amount of unpaid work
that the households needs. As demand for women’s paid work increases, unpaid
work falls - although there is a lower bound below which it cannot fall further. The
following equation explains the time spent for unpaid work.
UWT = max{U,H − Lf/Nf} (1.3)
2‘Unpaid work’ and ’unpaid care work’ are not necessarily the same. Unpaid work might include
other types of work in addition to unpaid care work. However, I will use them interchangeably
throughout the text.
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where UWT shows unpaid work time, and U is a baseline level that women’s unpaid
work could not fall below. In Equation 1.3, H is equal to 24 minus required personal
care time for women in a daily analysis. Women can divide H − U hours for either
paid or unpaid work. Lf/Nf indicates the average time a women spend for paid
work. While the first two equations above show the amount that all men and women
work, the last equation shows how an individual woman divides her time between
paid and unpaid work. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between output and
male, female labor in addition to the time use for unpaid work. Lf , labor demand
curve in the female sector, is steeper than Lm, labor demand curve in the male sector,
as a result of greater labor intensity.
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Figure 1.1: Labor output relationship, unpaid work
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As with most structuralist model, a mark-up rule determines the price level, and
it can be shown as P = wmb ∗ σm(1 + τ) + wfc ∗ σf (1 + θ) where τ and θ are the
mark-up rates for male and female sectors, σm is the male sector’s share of total
market output, and σf is the female sector’s share of total market output. Mark-up
parameters, τ and θ are fixed, 0 < τ < 1, 0 < θ < 1. They reflect the power of
capitalist and organized labor, and the distributional process in each sector. Similar
to the parameters that Taylor(1990) describes, some parameters identifies the other.
In this model, these parameters are 1 + τ = 1
1−pim and 1 + θ =
1
1−pif .
The price level is
P =
wmb ∗ σm
1− pim +
wfc ∗ σf
1− pif (1.4)
where w is nominal wage rate, pim is the profit share of male intensive sector, pif is
the profit share of female intensive sector. The female real wage is
ωf =
wf
wmb∗σm
1−pim +
wf c∗σf
1−pif
(1.5)
ωf =
wf (1− pim)(1− pif )
wmb ∗ σm(1− pif ) + wfc ∗ σf (1− pim) (1.6)
or
ωf =
(1− pim)(1− pif )
wm
wf
b ∗ σm(1− pif ) + c ∗ σf (1− pim) (1.7)
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Similarly, the male real wage is
ωm =
wm
wmb∗σm
1−pim +
wf c∗σf
1−pif
(1.8)
ωm =
wm(1− pim)(1− pif )
wmb ∗ σm(1− pif ) + wfc ∗ σf (1− pim) (1.9)
or
ωm =
(1− pim)(1− pif )
b ∗ σm(1− pif ) + wfwm c ∗ σf (1− pim)
(1.10)
where Y is total market output, and Yh is total non-market output. The female
market output (Yf ) and the male market output (Ym) represent the output of paid
employment. Total output is
YT = Y + Yh (1.11)
Y = Ym + Yf (1.12)
YT = Ym + Yf + Yh (1.13)
The output amounts in the male and female sectors are proportions of the total
market output, Ym = σmY and Yf = σfY where σm+σf = 1. For the simple case, the
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parameters σm and σf are assumed to be constant as a simplifying assumption. This
assumption is relaxed later. Constant output shares imply that capacity utilization
is the same across sectors. Because it is a short run model, capital is not mobile
between sectors. K = Km + Kf where Km is the capital stock in the male sector,
and Kf is the capital stock in the female sector. Capacity utilization, z, is equal to
Y/Y where Y is the full capacity output. Capacity utilization in male and female
sectors are zm = Ym/Ym, and zf = Yf/Yf .
The profit rate is
℘ = R/K = (R/Y )(Y/Y )(Y /K) (1.14)
where R is total profit, R/Y is profit share(pi), Y/Y is capacity utilization(z), Y /K
is full capacity output divided by the capital stock.
We define call full-capacity output divided by the capital stock as k.
k =
Y
K
(1.15)
For each sector this expression will be ki =
Y i
Ki
where i = m, f for male and female
sectors. Therefore, we can show the capital stock as follows:
K =
Y
k
=
Y f
kf
+
Y m
km
=
σfY
kf
+
σmY
km
(1.16)
If we divide each side by the full capacity utilization,
K
Y
=
σf
kf
+
σm
km
(1.17)
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In the model, the state variables are profit share(pi), and capacity utilization(z).
The relationship between the state variables is reflected by the investment/saving
equilibrium (the IS curve) and a supply-side functional relationship capturing the
relationship between the profit share and capacity utilization.
1.3.1 The demand side
The IS curve shows the investment and saving relationship which reflects the
demand side relationship. Investment divided by capital stock is3:
i =
I
K
= i0 + i[℘(pi, z)] = i0 + i(pi, z) (1.18)
Saving divided by capital stock is given by:
s =
S
K
= [spipi + sw(1− pi)]z (1.19)
In equilibrium, investment and saving are equal, i = s. We can derive the IS
curve by finding the set of points satisfying this equilibrium relationship.
i0 + i(pi, z) = [spipi + sw(1− pi)]z (1.20)
ipidpi + izdz = (spi − sw)zdpi + [spipi + sw(1− pi)]dz (1.21)
3In the long-run, there will be also an investment in human capital as a result of non-market
work; however, because this is a short-run model, I did not include household investment.
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[ipi − (spi − sw)z]dpi = {[spipi + sw(1− pi)]− iz} (1.22)
dpi
dz
=
spipi + sw(1− pi)− iz
ipi − (spi − sw)z (1.23)
The slope of the IS curve indicates whether the economy is wage led or profit led4.
The Keynesian stability condition requires that spipi + sw(1 − pi) − iz > 0. In other
words, saving is more responsive than investment to changes in capacity utilization.
Therefore, if the Keynesian stability condition holds, the numerator is positive. If
(spi−sw)−ipi > 0 then the denominator is negative and IS curve is downward sloping.
If (spi−sw)− ipi < 0 then the denominator is positive and IS curve is upward sloping.
Downward and upward sloping IS curves are illustrated in Figure 1.2.
4The purpose of this study is not to contribute to the wage led vs. profit led economy discussion
but to use this framework to analyze the impact of a macroeconomic policy change.
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Figure 1.2: Downward and upward sloping IS curve
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1.3.2 The supply side
Supply-side relations are derived from the equations describing the product mar-
ket. The price level for the male sector is given by:
Pm = (1 + τ)bwm (1.24)
The price level for the female sector is represented by:
Pf = (1 + θ)cwf (1.25)
From these expressions, we can calculate the general price level:
P = wmb ∗ σm(1 + τ) + wfc ∗ σf (1 + θ) (1.26)
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Wages are a function of capacity utilization, such that:
wm = wm(z) (1.27)
wf = wf (z) (1.28)
We can represent the producer’s equilibrium as follows:
The male intensive sector:
pim = 1− bwm(z) (1.29)
The female intensive sector:
pif = 1− cwf (z) (1.30)
Aggregating across sectors gives us:
pi = 1− [σmbwm(z) + σfcwf (z)] (1.31)
dpi
dz
= −(σmbwmz + σfcwfz) (1.32)
The slope of PE curve, given by Equation 1.32, depends on how nominal male
and female wage rates change with capacity utilization (wmz and wfz). Increase in
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capacity utilization decrease unemployment rates, and increases worker’s bargaining
power relative to capital 5. As discussed in Taylor (1990); Braunstein (2000); Braun-
stein et al. (2011), bargaining power is one of the factors that determines nominal
wages. Workers who gain more bargaining power receive higher wages. Therefore,
we assume that nominal wages increases with a rise in capacity utilization. In this
case, the PE curve is downward as shown in the Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Downward PE curve with upward and downward IS curve
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5There is also a gender difference for bargaining powers of women and men. I will address this
in other sections.
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1.4 Aggregate Demand Shocks
1.4.1 The effects of fiscal policy
In this section, I modify the IS schedule to introduce the effects of fiscal poli-
cies. The simple investment-savings equilibrium can be augmented to include fiscal
balances. Incorporating the public sector, we can express the saving-investment
equilibrium in terms of public and private savings and investments as follows:
(Y − T − C) + (T −G) = Ipublic + Iprivate (1.33)
where T,C,G are tax revenues, consumption, and government spendings respectively;
and (Y −T −C), (T −G), Ipublic, Iprivate show private savings, public savings, public
investment, and private investment respectively. Similar to Dutt (1984), I add a
government budget constraint. The government budget equation is as follows:
pG = tw(wmLm + wfLf ) + tcrpK +D (1.34)
where G is government expenditure, tc is a tax on capitalist income, tw is a tax on the
income of paid workers, and D is the government fiscal deficit in money terms. For
simplicity, I ignore indirect taxes on commodities. When the government balances
its budget, D = 0. The fiscal policy variables are G, tc, tw. The commodity market
equilibrium condition is
Y = C + I +G (1.35)
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If we divide each component of the commodity market equilibrium by the capital
stock, the total market output-capital ratio is
u =
C + I +G
K
(1.36)
z
Y
K
=
C + I +G
K
(1.37)
where u = Y
Y
Y
K
= z Y
K
. To look at a change in a policy variable, we need to keep the
other two parameters fixed. When government expenditures change, the output-
capital ratio increases/decreases due to the increase/decrease of the government
spending capital ratio. Because the full capacity output - capital stock ratio is con-
stant, the change in the output-capital ratio will be equal to the change in capacity
utilization. Therefore, contractionary fiscal policy by decreasing government spend-
ing, G
K
, will decrease capacity utilization. An increase in government expenditures
will increase the capacity utilization, and shift the IS curve to the right. Similarly,
a decrease in G, would shift the IS curve to the left, from IS1 to IS2 as shown in
Figure 1.4.
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Figure 1.4: The effect of a decrease in government expenditures
(a) with an upward sloping IS curve
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(b) with a downward sloping IS curve
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An aggregate demand shock which is caused by a fiscal policy change will shift
the IS curve. A contractionary fiscal policy would shift the IS curve to the left, and
capacity utilization will decrease from z1 to z2. Because the full capacity output is
constant, total market output declines.
1.4.1.1 Output and employment
The responsiveness of each sector to aggregate demand shocks determines the
capacity utilization in these sectors. Depending on the capacity utilization in each
sector, male and female employment reacts to fiscal policies (or monetary policies)
differently. I consider two cases. In the first case, for simplicity, I assume that the
responsiveness is the same across sectors and capacity utilization responds identically
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in each sector. In the second case, I present a model in which capacity utilization
responds differently in each sector. In addition, women supply labor to unpaid care
activities in the household.
Output share of male sector at full capacity output is represented by σm =
Ym
Y
. Similarly, the output share of female sector at full capacity utilization is σf =
1 − σm = YfY . Total capacity utilization and capacity utilization in each sector is
described below.
z = Y
Y
, zm =
Ym
Ym
, zf =
Yf
Yf
.
The actual output shares of male and female sectors are therefore given by:
σm =
Ym
Y
=
σmzm
z
(1.38)
σf = 1− σm = Yf
Y
=
σfzf
z
(1.39)
• Case 1: Same capacity utilization:
In the basic model, we first assume that capacity utilization in each sector equals
to total capacity utilization. Total capacity utilization is equal to summation of
capacity utilization times the output share at full capacity output in each sector.
We can define the total capacity utilization as follows:
z = zmσm + zfσf = zmσm + zf (1− σm) (1.40)
The total market output will change as a result of a monetary or fiscal policy
change. In this model, output changes in each sector will be equal to the total
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market output change times the output share (which must be constant if capacity
utilization is identical). The parameters that show the output share in male and
female sectors are σm and σf . When the capacity utilization is same across sectors,
these parameters will be constant, and same as the output share in full capacity
output. The output changes in male and female sectors are:
∆Ym = σm∆Y = σm∆Y
∆Yf = σf∆Y = σf∆Y
Because labor-output parameters, b and c are positive, a decrease in output will
decrease the employment for both men and women. Lf , the female labor demand
curve, is steeper than Lm, the male demand curve. The effect on male output is
∆Lm = bσm∆Y (1.41)
The effect on female output is
∆Lf = cσf∆Y (1.42)
The change in average time use in unpaid work is
∆Lhh = − 1
Nf
∆Lf (1.43)
∆Lhh = −cσf∆Y
Nf
(1.44)
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As shown in Figure 1.5, male employment, female employment, and average work
time will move from Li1 to Li2 where i = m, f, hh. The same amount of decline in
output leads to a relatively larger decline in female employment because female
sector is more labor intensive. With a decline in the market output, the time spent
for unpaid work increases.
The impact of macroeconomic policy changes on output might increase women’s
employment, and it also implies that women might do less unpaid care work. How-
ever, it is not clear that if the total production of goods and services would increase.
Even though it is unpaid and most of the time it is unrecognized, women’s unpaid
domestic work constitutes a significant part of production. Thus, the overall welfare
effect is unclear.
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Figure 1.5: Labor output relationship, unpaid work, with the simple function
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• Case 2: Different capacity utilization in each sector:
In this case male and female sectors can respond differently to the changes in ag-
gregate demand. Total capacity utilization represents changes in aggregate demand,
and each sector has different capacity utilization.
zi = diz (1.45)
where i = m, f , and di is a parameter that shows the proportion of capacity utiliza-
tion in each sector. When the capacity utilization is same across sectors, dm = df = 1.
If dm > 1 and df < 1, the male sector is more responsive to changes in aggregate
demand. If dm < 1 and df > 1, the female sector is more responsive to changes
in aggregate demand. The expression for calculating total capacity utilization is as
follows:
z = dmzσm + dfzσf (1.46)
1 = dmσm + dfσf (1.47)
Since the shares of potential output are given in the short-run, once we know dm, we
automatically know df .
df =
1− dmσm
σf
=
1− dmσm
1− σm (1.48)
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This implies that if the male sector is more responsive to changes in capacity utiliza-
tion, the female sector must be less responsive, and vice versa.
In this case, the capacity utilization is different across sectors. Capacity utiliza-
tion in each sector is a parameter (di) times total capacity utilization. The output
changes in each sector can be defined as follows:
∆Ym = σm∆Y = σmdm∆Y (1.49)
∆Yf = σf∆Y = σfdf∆Y (1.50)
Different capacity utilization in each sector will also affect employment in each
sector. Employment changes in male and female sectors can be expressed as follows:
∆Lm = bσmdm∆Y (1.51)
∆Lf = cσfdf∆Y (1.52)
The change in the average unpaid work time is as follows:
Lhh =
−cσfdf∆Y
Nf
(1.53)
Below, I present examples for each case. In the first one (Case 2a), the female
sector reacts more to changes in aggregate demand, and in the second one (Case 2b),
aggregate demand changes affect the male sector more.
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• Case 2a:
As an example, assume that at the full capacity utilization, the male sector
constitutes 60% of the market economy and the female sector has 40% output share.
Suppose the male sector is less responsive to changes in aggregate demand, so dm =
0.8. When total capacity output drops by 10%, capacity utilization in the male
sector only drops by 8%. In this case, df is equal to 1.3. Capacity utilization in the
female sector drops by 1.3 times total capacity utilization. Similarly, output in this
sector declines more.
df =
1− (0.8 ∗ 0.6)
0.4
= 1.3 (1.54)
In this case, female sector will be more affected from the decline in capacity
utilization. This case can be illustrated with the following graphs:
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Figure 1.6: Labor output relationship, unpaid work, with the simple function
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In the above example, the female sector reacts changes in aggregate demand more.
Therefore, in this case, there are two channels through which macro policy can affect
women’s employment disproportionately: the labor intensity of production, and the
responsiveness to aggregate demand.
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• Case 2b:
Now in this example, let’s suppose the output share is the same as the above
example but the male sector is more responsive to the changes in aggregate demand.
For example, if dm = 1.2, capacity utilization in the male sector would drop 1.2 times
as the drop in the total capacity utilization, and df would be equal to 0.7. In this case,
female sector is less sensitive to aggregate demand changes. A drop in total capacity
utilization would have a larger negative effect on women’s employment because of
labor intensity but could affect men’s employment more because of sensitivity to
aggregate demand. The total effect is uncertain. If the labor intensity in the female
sector has a greater effect than different capacity utilization rates, aggregate demand
shocks affect female employment more. If capacity utilization has greater influence,
male employment will be affected more. This case could explain the scenario where
male sector is more affected from economic crises, which has been referred in the
literature as the case of a ‘man-cession’.
df =
1− (1.2 ∗ 0.6)
0.4
= 0.7 (1.55)
In this case, while dm is larger than 1, df is smaller than 1. Therefore, the decline
in the capacity utilization would be larger in the male sector. Figure 1.7 illustrates
this case. However, because female sector is more labor intensive, the overall effect
is ambiguous.
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Figure 1.7: Labor output relationship, unpaid work, with the simple function
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1.4.1.2 Extension for unpaid work
Women divide their working time between paid and unpaid work. In the bench-
mark model, women do unpaid work as much as the maximum amount among the
following two: minimum required unpaid work time (U) and the difference between
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the maximum work time and average paid work time. The benchmark model for the
unpaid work time is
UWT = max{U,H − Lf
Nf
} (1.56)
In the extended version, maximum working hours are also endogenous, and a
function of total household income available for spending on substitutes for services
produced with unpaid work.
H = H[a(wm
Lm
Nm
) + (wf
Lf
Nf
)] (1.57)
where a is a parameter that represents the degree of income pooling, and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
The degree of income pooling reflects the amount of men’s income that can be spent
on substitutes for women’s unpaid work. If a is equal to zero, H only depends on
women’s income. In this case, women need to use only their income in order to
substitute away form unpaid work. As a increases, which represents more income
pooling in the household, H depends more on household income. If a is equal to 1,
maximum working hours for women are a function of total household income.
Male and female income has two components: male and female wages times male
and female average paid working hours (wm
Lm
Nm
, wf
Lf
Nf
). An increase in capacity
utilization, actual output divided by full capacity output, affects household income
by raising both wages and paid employment. Higher output will increase employment
or paid work time, which also increases household income. When household income
increases, maximum hours a woman needs to work will decrease. Similarly, a drop in
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the output, as a result of a fiscal or monetary shock, will increase the total amount
of time a woman needs to work (including time spent in unpaid work). Therefore,
we can express the equation as follows:
H = H[a(wm(
Ym
Ym
)
Lm(Ym)
Nm
) + (wf (
Yf
Yf
)
Lf (Yf )
Nf
)] (1.58)
where LmYm > 0, Lf Yf > 0, wmYm > 0, and wf Yf > 0.
The first derivative of H represents the degree to which market income can substi-
tute for non-market work. If H ′ is equal to zero, they can not buy market substitutes.
As H ′ decreases, this implies a greater degree of substitutions. In the rest of this sec-
tion, I assume that H ′ is negative. As households become richer, they can purchase
market substitutes and reduce the time spent on unpaid work. In the model, this
effectively increases the time women have for leisure or personal care. The extended
function of unpaid work time can be expressed as follows:
UWT = max{U,H[a(wm(Ym
Ym
)
Lm(Ym)
Nm
) + (wf (
Yf
Yf
)
Lf (Yf )
Nf
)]− Lf
Nf
} (1.59)
where HLm < 0, HLf < 0, , Hw < 0, and HY < 0.
Paid work time affects unpaid work time both directly and indirectly through
maximum working hours. Maximum working hours will be affected from the average
per person paid work time in addition to wages. Maximum working hours decrease
with an increase in total income of the household, and they increase with a decrease
in income. Both wages and paid work time lead to an increase in total income of
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the household. Unpaid work time rises with an increase in maximum working hours.
If female and male wages are high, women do not need to work as much so unpaid
working time decreases. Households can afford to buy market substitutes of home
production or care services.
When contractionary fiscal or monetary policies lead to a decline in market out-
put, total working time for women will increase. Because the household can not afford
some of the paid care services, the woman would provide some of the care services
without a payment, in other words, unpaid work time for women will increase.
1.4.1.3 Extension for labor supply and unpaid work
This extension formalizes both the unpaid work time and paid work time. In
addition to the labor demand function discussed above, a labor supply function can
be used to determine paid work time. The labor demand function is the same as the
previous sections; Lf = cYf .
Average paid work time is a proxy for the female labor supply for paid work,
and it is the difference between the maximum working hours and unpaid work time.
Unpaid work time determines the female labor supply in the labor supply function
(Equation 1.60). There is a negative relationship between the paid and unpaid work,
and paid work time increases with both female and male sectors’ market output.
In this section, I assume that non-market household output is a substitute for the
output produced by women’s paid work. Therefore, the decision between producing
with unpaid household labor or purchasing in the market will affect household wel-
fare. Economic expansion increases women’s labor supply because of two reasons;
paid work opportunities, and the ability to purchase market substitutes.
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In this extension, women’s decision on the amount of time devoted to paid or
unpaid work depends on women’s bargaining power in the household. The ratio
of women’s wage to men’s wage is a proxy for women’s bargaining power. Thus,
intra-household dynamics play a role in women’s decision. As the ratio of women’s
wages to men’s wages falls, women specialize more in unpaid work. Unpaid work
time function is
UWT = UWT (
wf
wm
) (1.60)
where UWT ′ < 0.
Average paid working hours of women is a proxy for female labor supply, and it
is the difference between women’s total working hours minus unpaid work time.
Lf
Nf
= H − UWT (wf
wm
) (1.61)
In this case, the maximum working hours for women is fixed, and female paid
work time responds to household income. Capacity utilization determines wages so
when capacity utilization increases, wages also rise. The ratio of female and male
wages will be based on responsiveness of wages to capacity utilization. If men’s wages
respond more strongly than women’s, it could mean that women actually specialize
more in unpaid work during economic booms.
Lf
Nf
= H − UWT ( Yf
Ym
) (1.62)
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This extension emphasizes the labor supply side more than the labor demand
side. In some cases, labor supply would determine output in the female sector rather
than aggregate demand - i.e. total output will be constrained by the supply of labor
more than demand for output. Of course, if the demand falls to a low level, not all
women can be employed when women’s wages are high.
Both female labor demand and female labor supply has a positive relationship
with the output in the female sector. When there is more output, employers want
to hire more workers. When there is more output, nominal wages also increase
so women do not need to do as much unpaid domestic work, which increases the
supply for paid work. The difference between the labor supply and the labor demand
represents unemployment. The amount of the female unemployment depends on the
relative responsiveness of labor demand and labor supply to the output change.
A decline in female employment can result from either a labor demand (derived
from aggregate demand) or a labor supply constraint (when women are increasingly
specializing in unpaid household production). Cuts in government spending have a
direct effect on both labor demand and labor supply. The relative responsiveness of
labor supply and labor demand to output determines whether demand or supply is a
constraint for female employment. The level of output also has a role in determining
the constraint. I examine four cases to discuss labor demand and supply constraints.
Firstly, I present the case that labor demand in female sector is more responsive to
output changes than labor supply. In this case, the labor demand curve is steeper
than the labor supply curve in the female sector. In Figure 1.8a, output is under a
certain point that there is a demand constraint. There might not be enough jobs
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even if women want to work in paid employment. However, if output rises above a
certain point, as illustrated in Figure 1.8b, there is a supply constraint.
Figure 1.8: Labor demand and labor supply (when labor demand is more responsive)
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Now, I present the case where the labor supply curve is steeper than the labor
demand curve in the female sector. Labor supply is more responsive to an output
change than the labor demand. Figure 1.9a and Figure 1.9b show the cases with an
output below and above the point at which a supply constraint becomes meaningful.
In the first case there is a supply constraint because of the unpaid work burden of
women. Even if there are enough jobs, female employment still decreases because of
a lack of labor supply. In the second case, there is a demand constraint.
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Figure 1.9: Labor demand and labor supply
(when labor supply is more responsive)
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1.4.2 The effect of monetary policy
In this section, I discuss the effect of a monetary policy on female and male
sectors’ output. There are different tools used to conduct monetary policies. One
commonly used approach is to target a policy interest rate in order to try to achieve
a particular outcome, such as lower inflation or greater employment. In this model,
I represent monetary policy decisions using the Taylor rule. The nominal interest
rate is a function of the gap between actual and desired capacity utilization, and the
gap between actual inflation and desired inflation.
n = r + piT + ρ1(z − z∗) + ρ2(pi − piT ) (1.63)
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where n is the nominal interest rate, r is the constant real interest rate, z? is the
steady growth value of the capacity utilization, piT is the target inflation rate. The
inflation rate is
pi = pie + η1(z − z∗) + ε (1.64)
where pie is the expected inflation, and ε is a supply-side shock variable with an
expected value of zero. Connecting the equations (1.63) and (1.64), and using the
Fisher equation r = n − pie − ε, we can obtain the equation that determines the
real interest rate. According to the Fisher equation, n = r + pie + ε. If we use this
expression for pie in equation 1.64, the nominal interest rate is n = r+pi−η1(z−z∗)+ε.
If we substitute this equation into equation 63, the rule for targeting the real policy
interest rate is
r = r¯ + (ρ1 + η1)(z − z∗) + (ρ2 − 1)(pi − piT ) = r¯ + ρ˜1(z − z∗) + ρ˜2(pi − piT ) (1.65)
where ρ˜1 = (ρ1 + η1), ρ˜2 = ρ2 − 1.
Policymakers decide the policy interest rate according to an interest rate rule.
Equation 1.65 represents this interest rate rule, according to which the real interest
rate is equal to its estimate of equilibrium plus a function of capacity utilization
and inflation. Central banks target the real interest rate based on that rule. The
target of monetary policy can be growth and employment or simply inflation. If
the monetary policy target is to lower inflation, policy makers increase the policy
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interest rate. Increases in the interest rate will decrease the investment which causes
a leftward shift of IS curve. Capacity utilization falls.
The interest rate increases with an increase in capacity utilization. This rela-
tionship is shown as the upward shift of the interest rate curve. However, a higher
interest rate will decrease investment and shift the IS curve to the left, which causes
a decline in the equilibrium level of capacity utilization. Therefore, the capacity uti-
lization in Figure 1.10 shifts to the left. In the new equilibrium, the nominal interest
rate is higher.
Figure 1.10: Interest rate and capacity utilization
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By considering the monetary policy, I modify the investment function as follows:
I = I0 + I(℘− r) (1.66)
50
in which investment is also a function of the real interest rate in addition to the
profit rate. The real interest rate is simply the opportunity cost, the rate of return
of alternative investment. Investment would respond to the difference in the profit
on that investment and its opportunity cost.
i =
I
K
= i0 + i[℘(pi, z)− r] (1.67)
or
i =
I
K
= i0 + i[℘(pi, z)− r(pi, z, n)] (1.68)
i =
I
K
= i0 + i(pi, z, n) (1.69)
where in < 0. By using the new investment demand function, I modify the investment-
saving equilibrium, i=s, and the IS schedule.
i0 + i(pi, z, n) = [spipi + sw(1− pi)]z (1.70)
ipidpi + izdz + indn = (spi − sw)zdpi + [spipi + sw(1− pi)]dz (1.71)
dpi
dz
=
spipi + sw(1− pi)− iz
ipi − (spi − sw) (1.72)
The relationship between the profit share and capacity utilization is the same
in the modified version. However, changes in the interest rate shift the IS curve.
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For example, an increase in the interest rate would decrease investment, and shift
the IS curve to the left as shown in Figure 1.11. Its impacts on market output and
employment would be similar to the contractionary fiscal policy.
Figure 1.11: The effect of an increase in the policy rate
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When policymakers care strongly about inflation over market output, they are
less likely to pursue expansionary policy and more likely to pursue contractionary
policy. Therefore, in an inflation targeting regime, the output and employment will
be lower than a regime with both output and inflation targeting.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes impacts of fiscal and monetary policies on gender disaggre-
gated employment and women’s unpaid work by using a structuralist macroeconomic
model. In the simple case in which capacity utilization is assumed to be the same
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across sectors, aggregate demand shocks affect female employment more because the
female sector is more labor intensive. If capacity utilization rate is more responsive
to changes in aggregate demand in the female sector, there are two channels through
which macroeconomic policies affect women’s employment more; the labor intensity
of production, and the responsiveness to aggregate demand. If the responsiveness of
capacity utilization to aggregate demand is larger in the male sector, the overall ef-
fect is uncertain. Macroeconomic policies might affect the male sector more because
of its sensitivity to aggregate demand but they might influence the female sector
more because of labor intensity.
Higher market output increases both employment and wages. When household in-
come increases, it can be spent on substitutes for women’s unpaid work. The amount
spent depends on the income pooling between the couple. Increase in women’s earn-
ings, or household income if the income pooling is high, would decrease the time
spent in unpaid work. On the other hand, when market output declines as a result
of aggregate demand shocks, women spend more time in unpaid work because the
household cannot afford to buy the paid care services.
In this structuralist model, aggregate demand shocks affect employment mainly
through labor demand. However, the last extension of the model shows that ag-
gregate demand shocks may also have an effect on employment indirectly through
labor supply. When the household cannot afford to buy market substitutes for un-
paid work, women need to spend more time in non-market activities. This could
generate a labor supply constraints - meaning that women’s paid employment is
supply-constrained, rather than demand-constrained. Even if there are enough jobs
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in the female sector, women may not do more paid work because of the unpaid work
burden.
This paper shows that fiscal and monetary policies might have a disproportionate
impact on female employment both directly, and indirectly through women’s unpaid
work. Women’s specialization in unpaid work tends to reduce their bargaining power
in the household, and also to increase the reserve army of female labor. However, it is
hard to predict the welfare effect. Because women’s unpaid work also contributes to
the production, the transfer of women’s labor from unpaid work to paid work or from
paid work to unpaid work might have changes in either direction. This paper does
not discuss the measurement of contribution of unpaid work, which can be a further
research topic for overall welfare analysis on the gendered effects of macroeconomic
policy changes.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON
GENDER-SPECIFIC EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
2.1 Introduction
Women and men can experience different employment outcomes as a result of
macroeconomic policy choices for a variety of reasons, such as labor market segrega-
tion, gender division of labor or labor supply dynamics. Women and men employed
in paid jobs are usually concentrated in different economic activities. Fiscal policies
can affect these sectors differently, yielding distinct employment outcomes. Gender
roles impact the division of labor in the household; women traditionally have bur-
den of unpaid care work while men are the primary breadwinners. Because of this,
women’s care work responsibility affects their participation in the labor force. In
this chapter, I estimate the effects of changes to fiscal policy on women’s and men’s
employment. Specifically, I focus on gender implications of efforts to reduce fiscal
deficits, commonly termed “fiscal consolidation”.
I empirically examine whether fiscal consolidation disproportionately affects fe-
male employment rate in 17 OECD countries1 during 1978-2009. I also test some
1Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, United States
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labor demand and labor supply channels to shed light on the channels through which
fiscal policies may influence female employment rates relative to male employment
rates.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating gender implications of
fiscal consolidation using narrative data derived by Devries et al. (2011). The nar-
rative approach is a methodology that identifies changes in macroeconomic policies
by examining historical documents (such as budgets or federal reserve Greenbooks).
This approach aims to identify discretionary policy shocks which are not a response
to prospective economic conditions. Therefore, it can address potential endogene-
ity problems which arise from fiscal indicators shifting due to changes in economic
conditions other than deliberate policy decisions.
I estimate the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on gender disaggregated employment
rates for up to 8 years using Jorda (2005)’s local projections technique, a method
designed to estimate and infer impulse responses. For the estimations, I utilize a
country level annual panel dataset for OECD countries, and control for country and
time fixed effects, and country specific time trends. I use panel data analysis because
it produces results that are common across countries while controlling for unobserved
country-specific factors.
The results show that discretionary fiscal consolidation, which is primarily mo-
tivated by the goal of reducing budget deficits, has a disproportionate impact on
female employment. The effects are stronger between 3-6 years after fiscal consolida-
tion. The impact is driven by the effect on female employment, and spending-based
fiscal consolidation. The results are robust to controlling for the female labor force
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participation rate, sectoral structure of the country, and female employment shares
in different economic activities. Although work-family policies may have an impact
on the relationship between fiscal policies and gender-specific employment outcomes,
estimates using available data are inconclusive.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section (Section 2), I summa-
rize the literature on fiscal policy and gender. Section 3 discusses possible channels
of disproportionate effects of fiscal policies on gender-specific employment rates. Sec-
tion 4 explains the data and methodology used, and presents the empirical analysis
and results. Specifically, I present the impact of fiscal consolidation on gender dis-
aggregated employment rates, the difference between tax and spending-based fiscal
consolidation, and several robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Although the literature on the gender aspects of fiscal policies is broad, I focus
specifically on gender-specific employment outcomes of fiscal policies. The broader
literature examines a range of topics such as structural adjustment policies (Cagatay,
2003; Elson, 1995a; Beneria, 1995), gender responsive budgeting2 (Cagatay, 2003; El-
son and Sharp, 2010), tax policies (Grown, 2010; Valodia, 2010; Elson, 2006; Barnett
and Grown, 2004), and economic crises and austerity policies (Cagatay, 2003; Ortiz
and Cummins, 2013; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2014; Rubery, 2014; Albelda, 2014;
2Gender responsive budget analysis is an area that proposes ways to challenge the distributive
outcomes implicit in standard approaches to public finance, and may represent a step towards a
gender-equal and pro-poor budget.
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Rubery and Rafferty, 2014). However, this literature is general and mostly descrip-
tive. Here I focus on more specific employment effects using econometric analysis.
Research on relative employment rates by gender suggests asymmetric effects of
fiscal policies that vary over the business cycle. However, the findings of research
studies vary considerably. Bredemeier et al. (2015) argue that contractionary non-
fiscal shocks decreases male employment rates more than female employment rates
while expansionary fiscal shocks raise female employment rates relatively more. They
explain this impact through an increase in employment in female-dominated occupa-
tions. Perivier (2018) finds mixed patterns among countries in terms of the effect of
crisis and austerity on female and male employment rates. For example, while Spain
is an example of ‘he-cession to sh(e)-austerity’3, in Denmark and the United King-
dom, women experienced the negative effects of recession more acutely than men,
and in Greece both men and women experienced dramatic decrease in employment.
Hoynes et al. (2012) indicate that because men are concentrated in cyclically sensi-
tive industries, they experience more pronounced cyclical labor market outcomes as a
result of both recession and recovery. They also show that some groups experienced
the employment effects of the Great Recession more than other groups in the United
States. Employment of men, blacks, Hispanics, youth, and those with lower educa-
tion levels fell more than women, white, prime-aged workers, and those with higher
education levels. Akitoby et al. (2019) show that expansionary fiscal shocks during
3Karamessini and Rubery (2014) use this phrase to express that recession affects sectors in which
men are over-represented (construction and manufacturing), and austerity policies influence sectors
that over-represent women (the public sector, services).
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recessions have a positive impact on gender equality in employment, while the effect
is smaller during booms. They explain the increase in female employment relative to
male employment during recessions by gender dynamics in industries, occupations,
and employment types.
There is also a literature that discusses effects of specific fiscal policy instruments
using cross-country data. Ortiz and Cummins (2013) examine two variables as in-
dicators of total government spending: public expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
and the real value of public expenditure using data from International Monetary
Fund (IMF) fiscal projections and IMF country reports in addition to the literature
review of historical evidence and World Bank surveys. They analyze projections for
128 developing countries in 2012. They look at two sub-periods; the period of fiscal
stimulus packages during 2008-09, and the period of fiscal austerity during 2010-2012.
They examine four adjustment policies that are often implemented under fiscal aus-
terity: cutting the wage bill of public sector employees, removing subsidies, achieving
cost saving, and reforming old-age pensions to scale back public spending (Ortiz and
Cummins, 2013, p.67-68). Their results indicate that all of these adjustment poli-
cies disproportionately affect children and women mostly through changes in social
sector spending allocations. Braunstein and Seguino (2018) examine the impact of
economic policy and structural change on gender employment inequality in Latin
America from 1990 to 2010. They evaluate the effects of social and economic poli-
cies, macroeconomic policies and measures of economic structure on gender equality.
They look at the impacts of several variables. Two of the variables examined rep-
resent important fiscal policy indicators: social public expenditures made by central
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governments as a share of GDP and public investment as a share of GDP. They uti-
lize two estimation techniques: simple OLS (fixed effect panel estimation technique)
and two stage least squares (2SLS). Their results show that higher social spending
increases women’s employment. Even though, public investment improves both male
and female employment, female employment increases more.
The role of the public sector, which is often dominated by female employment, is
an important factor to understand the gender impact of budget cuts. Public sector
jobs and public services are essential for providing women opportunities for paid
employment, and they affect the burden of unpaid household work(Rubery, 2014,
p.33). Therefore, budget cuts tend to affect women more heavily than men. Even
though economic crises might first affect private male dominated sectors, austerity
measures in response to the downturn affects the public sector, which can have a
disproportionate impact on women. On the other hand, Karamessini (2014, p. 176),
investigating the Greek context, argues that, in terms of sheer numbers, men experi-
ence the negative effects of budget cuts more because they constitute a higher total
share of public employees. However, adoption of 2010-2014 Economic Adjustment
Program also affected women workers in Greece. Their public sector employment
decreased more than men’s mainly because of the impact of voluntary retirement.
Mandel and Semyonov (2006) provide a sociological approach to the relationship be-
tween state interventions and women’s employment opportunities. They show that
welfare states help to increase women’s labor force participation rate through their
roles as a legislator, as a provider of social services, and as an employer. Public
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employment provides job opportunities for women especially in care and services
job.
The effect of fiscal policies on gender-specific employment rates may be medi-
ated by work-family policies. Therefore, countries with different family policies may
experience distinct outcomes with regard to fiscal policies. The sociology literature
(Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Budig et al., 2012;
Misra et al., 2012; Boeckmann et al., 2015) considers several work-family policy indi-
cators that capture gender gaps and motherhood penalties. These indicators include
maternal and parental leaves, family allowances, and public services for child care.
Some uses an index reflecting all policy variables, and some tests each policy variables
separately. There are also different approaches for formulating an index. Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006) use factor analysis to construct the Welfare State Interven-
tion Index (interventions to facilitate women’s employment). Gornick and Meyers
(2003) create sub-indices for twenty two policy variables. They rescale the indicators
from high value (more policy support) to low value, and rescale all of them again
between 0 and 1. They convert rescaled indicators to seven sub-indices. Then they
combine these sub-indices using a weighing scheme to produce three indexes. On
the other hand, Budig et al. (2012) focuses on two work-family policy indicators:
leave policies (maternal and parental leave available to women) and childcare poli-
cies. Depending on their length, leave policies may support or discourage women’s
employment. While women continue their jobs after a moderate leave, they may
choose to leave employment as a result of either too long leaves, too short leaves, or
the absence of family leave altogether (Budig et al., 2012).
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To isolate their effect, fiscal policies should be exogenous to other variables. How-
ever, fiscal policies are frequently endogenous and are likely to be correlated with
other variables. There are different identification strategies in the literature to deal
with this problem, and analyze causal effects of fiscal policies. One common way is us-
ing military spending instead of total government expenditures (Ramey and Shapiro,
1998; Ramey, 2009; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014). However, this approach would
not work for the research objectives of this chapter because military spending may
have completely different gender effects than total expenditures. The conventional
approach that investigates the effect of fiscal consolidation in the literature is the
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) approach (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009),
although this approach may underestimate the contractionary effects of fiscal con-
solidation. In this approach, changes to fiscal policy variables can have an effect on
nonpolicy variables that are likely correlated with economic developments that affect
output. In addition, discretionary policy changes identified by this approach might
be a response to cyclical fluctuations; thus, this approach would suffer from reverse
causality(Guajardo et al., 2014).
Another approach that examines the effects of fiscal policy is structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) approach (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2008)4. This
method aims to differentiate changes in fiscal variables as a response to output and
discretionary fiscal policy changes, and it controls for lags of output growth. However,
changes in government revenue and spending may still be correlated with other short
4Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) uses STVAR approach, which is similar to smooth tran-
sition autoregressive (STAR) models, and includes forecasts in the SVAR.
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term factors affecting output. This approach does not take “the issue of non-policy
changes in cyclically-adjusted fiscal data, and of forward-looking policy responses to
prospective economic conditions” into account (Romer and Romer, 2010; Guajardo
et al., 2014, p.950).
Instead, this paper overcomes these limitations by employing a narrative identi-
fication approach. The narrative identification approach is the most recent one and
has received significant attention since its introduction. The strength of this narra-
tive approach is to address the problems that CAPB and SVAR approaches have.
The narrative approach can identify fiscal policies that are not correlated to other
economic developments in the short term. The narrative approach has been applied
to identify both fiscal (such as Romer and Romer (2010); Ramey and Shapiro (1998);
Ramey (2009)) and monetary policies (such as Romer and Romer (2004)). Romer
and Romer (2004, 2010) identify discretionary monetary and fiscal shocks in the US
respectively. Devries et al. (2011); Guajardo et al. (2014) use the narrative approach
to identify fiscal consolidation, and they are the first to apply this approach to con-
struct a dataset of tax and spending changes for multi-country analysis (for OECD
countries). There is also an example that uses this approach to study the effects
of fiscal consolidation periods Latin American countries (Devries et al., 2011; David
and Leigh, 2018). Some papers use the dataset derived by Devries et al. (2011) to
examine dynamic effects of fiscal consolidation on several areas such as economic
growth and employment (Jorda and Taylor, 2013; Guajardo et al., 2014; Dell’Erba
et al., 2014) or income inequality (Ball et al., 2013; Woo et al., 2017; Heimberger,
2018).
63
The previous literature on fiscal policy and gender suggests the existence of the
gendered effects of austerity policies, changes in public spending and public invest-
ment. However, a significant part of this literature is descriptive. In the case of other
studies with more formal analysis, there is a possibility of the problem that their pol-
icy variables are likely to be correlated with the economic outlook. One approach
to this problem to is to use narrative data. However, the literature incorporating
narrative data does not take gender differences into account. My research combines
these two literature, and makes an empirical contribution by using narrative data
to analyze the impact of fiscal consolidation of gender-specific employment rates.
In that sense, my paper addresses potential endogeneity concerns, and thus provides
plausibly causal estimates of the effect of fiscal consolidation on gender-disaggregated
employment outcomes.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
I focus on two research questions in the remainder of the paper. Do fiscal policies
affect female employment rates disproportionately? And which labor demand and
labor supply channels explain the disproportionate impact of fiscal policies when they
exist? My hypothesis for the former is that fiscal consolidation with a motivation of
decreasing budget deficit has a disproportionate impact on female employment rates.
My hypothesis for the latter is that a combination of labor market segregation, the
economic structure of the country, and female labor supply are the mechanisms that
lead to different employment outcomes for women and men.
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Fiscal shocks affect female employment by two main channels: labor demand
channels such as labor market segregation and discrimination, and labor supply
channels such as burden of unpaid work and household bargaining. Fiscal policies
may affect female and male employment rates through aggregate demand shocks
and changes to specific areas of budgetary spending. Overall cuts to government
spending can cause stagnation which reduces employment opportunities. It decreases
employment for both men and women, but it may have a disproportionate impact
on women.
If there is a disproportionate effect on the female employment rate, what is the
source of the difference - through changes to men’s employment, women’s employ-
ment or both? I argue that the difference is driven by the effect on the female
employment rate. Fiscal policies would affect both employment rates; however, male
employment can recover faster than female employment, and the negative impact on
female employment could last longer.
Fiscal shocks can be either tax-based or spending based. Specifically, fiscal con-
solidation is applied by cutting expenditures and/or increasing taxes. I argue that
the disproportionate effect is driven by spending-based fiscal consolidation. Spend-
ing based shocks can affect public services more, which can be both a demand and
a supply channel. Because care workers are mostly women, and women also need
more public services, cutting expenditures would decrease female employment both
directly through the labor demand channel and indirectly through the labor supply
channel.
65
The model, developed in the first chapter, brings a theoretical explanation to
possible channels. The two main channels discussed in the model are related to
labor market segregation; the labor-intensity of female dominated sector and dif-
ferent responses of capacity utilization rates in male and female dominated sectors.
Aggregated demand shocks might affect female employment more because women
are employed in more labor intensive sectors or occupations. In addition, different
capacity utilization rates would affect the responsiveness of male and female domi-
nated sectors to output changes, which might determine the sector that will be more
affected from the aggregated demand shock.
Female and male workers are concentrated in different economic activities as a
result of gender segregation in the labor market. Since women are heavily employed
in public sector, we expect that these public sector cuts affect female employment
more than male employment. To test this channel, I control the results for female
employment share in six branches of economic activities, including public adminis-
tration. This exercise would show if broad changes in the structure of employment
is driving the result even though it does not provide an analysis with a data for
narrower economic activity branches.
The sectoral structure of the country can affect gendered effects of macroeconomic
policies. Fiscal consolidation policies might affect industry, service or agriculture
sectors differently. A country with a larger service sector and a country with a larger
industry sector may react to same macroeconomic policy differently. Gross value
added in each economic activity represents the economic structure in one of the
econometric specifications.
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In addition, the model also discusses the role of unpaid work burden of women.
When fiscal shocks squeeze the household budget, women cannot afford to buy sub-
stitutes of unpaid work, and might do more unpaid work. This would affect female
labor supply, and create a labor supply constraint. To test labor supply dynamics, I
control the results for female labor force participation rate.
Minimizing the role of public provisioning, commodification or marketization bias,
often involves reducing budget deficits without increasing the level of taxation but
by cutting public expenditures. This has potentially serious implications for the dis-
tribution of the costs of social reproduction (Cagatay, 2003). Cuts in public services
affect female employment through labor supply channels because public services af-
fect women’s unpaid care burden. When macroeconomic policies squeeze household
resources through labor market dynamics, this can affect women’s labor supply and
paid employment in two possible ways. It may increase paid employment of women if
women enter the labor force or it may decrease paid employment of women if women
withdraw to focus on unpaid household work. Female labor supply may respond to
budget cuts because of the need for more unpaid care work. Women who do more
unpaid work are required to provide care work if there is not enough provision of
public care facilities. Women and poorer segments of the population are more likely
to rely on public services. In effect, the state offsets gender biases in private sec-
tor employment and transfer payments through social provisioning (Cagatay, 2003,
p.19). ‘Women-friendly’ work-family policies can also help to be attached with em-
ployment. Therefore, I control the results for the inclusion of work-family policy
variables with available data.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Empirical strategy
I use a local projections estimation technique with fixed effects to examine the
impact of fiscal consolidation on women’s and men’s relative employment rates, and
I utilize annual country level panel data for 17 OECD countries from 1978 to 2009.
Local projections have some advantages. It is a flexible method to estimate dynamic
effects, and is more robust to misspecification than traditional VAR methods (Jorda,
2005; Jorda and Taylor, 2013)5. For example, through this method, I can explain
differences in the impacts of fiscal consolidation and fiscal expansion periods on
gender disaggregated employment rates.
My econometric specification can be expressed as follows:
erct+h − erct = β1hFCct + β2hXct + µc + τt + ηc + εct (2.1)
where er represents the ratio of female emloyment rate to male employment rate,
erct+h−erct represents the accumulated change from time t to t+h, and β1h is the im-
pulse response in horizon h. FC shows the size of fiscal consolidation as a percentage
of GDP, µc is country fixed effects, τt is time fixed effects, ηc is country specific trends,
and εct is the error term. Xct is a set of control variables
6. These control variables
include gross value added in agriculture, service, and industry, female employment
share in 6 activity branches (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and
5It is also easy to include nonlinearities and state-dependent dynamic responses although it is
not pursued in this paper.
6Table 2.1 shows definitions of all variables in the paper.
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quarrying, service, and public administration), and female labor force participation
rates as control variables. By incorporating these variables in the regression, I will be
able to comment on the possible channels through which fiscal consolidation affects
women’s and men’s employment.
The primary dependent variable of interest is the ratio of female employment
rate to male employment rate. I also look at impacts of fiscal policy variables on
both female and male employment rates separately to observe if both employment
rates are affected significantly. Fiscal policy shocks may also affect the time spent for
unpaid domestic care work. Because women do more unpaid care work, using time
spent by women in care work as a dependent variable would help reveal any gender
impact. However, a lack of data prevents this type of analysis within the framework
of this study.
The independent variable of primary interest is the size of fiscal consolidation.
Additionally, I employ tax based and spending based fiscal consolidation data to
provide information on whether they have different effects. As robustness checks, I
include gross value added, female employment share in each economic activity, and
FLFPR variables. Even though the data is not available for whole period, I also
present an overview of the effects of work family policy indicators.
69
Table 2.1: Definitions of Variables
Indicators
Variables Definitions
er Ratio of female employment rate to male employment rate
fer Female employment rate
mer Male employment rate
µ Country fixed effects
τ Time fixed effects
η Country specific trends
ε Error term
X Several possible control variables
EAi Gross value added in agriculture, service, and industry
FLFPR Female labor force participation rate
fsharei Female employment share in agriculture, service and industry
FC Size of fiscal consolidation as a % of GDP
TFC Size of tax based fiscal consolidation
SFC Size of spending based fiscal consolidation
Since the main independent variable is fiscal consolidation (reflects a decrease in
government expenditures or an increase in tax revenues), a negative effect means
a decrease in government expenditures leads to a relative decrease in the female
employment rate. Standard errors are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary autocorrelation.
2.4.2 Data
The main variables for the econometric estimations include fiscal consolidation
variables such as size of fiscal consolidation, tax and spending based fiscal consol-
idation; female and male employment rates; female employment share and gross
value added in agriculture, service and industry; female labor force participation
rate (FLFPP); and work family policy indicators. The main datasources are several
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OECD datasets, ILO datasets and a dataset derived by Devries et al. (2011) with a
narrative approach for 17 OECD countries.
Employment rates and labor force participation rate data comes from Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) database of labor statistics. Gross value added
in each economic activity data comes from the OECD National Accounts Statistics
database. Female employment share as a percentage of total employment in each
economic activity data is author’s calculation from the data constructed from the
ILO database of labor statistics.
For fiscal policy variables, I obtain data from Devries et al. (2011). Devries et al.
(2011) construct a dataset for discretionary fiscal policy, which is not a response to
cyclical fluctuations. Overall, they report 173 fiscal policy adjustments in 17 OECD
economies7 between 1978-2009. They read budget documents and international insti-
tutions’ reports to identify fiscal consolidation periods. To find discretionary shocks,
they do not include cyclical responses. Discretionary changes in taxes and govern-
ment expenditures may have two kinds of motivation: to reduce budget deficit and
to restrain domestic demand. The dataset only records discretionary fiscal contrac-
tion -increase in taxes or decrease in government spendings- primarily motivated by
a desire to reduce budget deficits. The dataset includes fiscal consolidation even for
the cases followed by an adverse shock or an offsetting countercyclical discretionary
stimulus. If there is another fiscal action, not motivated by cyclical fluctuations,
that offsets fiscal consolidation, they compute the sum of the measures, and accept
7Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, United States
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as fiscal consolidation only if the overall change shows budgetary savings. The fiscal
consolidation measurements represent the year in which they come into effect, and
they are at the general government level unless it is mentioned otherwise. They also
treat temporary and permanent measures differently. While temporary measures
have positive sign for the period in which they are effective, they have negative sign
when they expire. On the other hand, permanent measures have positive sign when
they come into effect, and they are recorded as zero afterwards.
The absolute value of the size of fiscal consolidation is between 0 and 1, and the
unit of measurement is percentage of GDP. The mean of the variable is 0.003, and
it ranges from -0.0075 to 0.0474. The mean and standard deviation of the ratio of
female to male employment rates are .0779 and 0.127 respectively, and it ranges from
0.397 to 0.986.
Gender-specific employment rates and female employment shares in different eco-
nomic activities vary among countries. I present summary statistics by country for
these variables in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Male employment rates are higher than
female employment rates in each country, and standard deviation is usually higher
for female employment rate. In Denmark, Finland, and Sweden female and male
employment rates are closer relative to other countries. The difference between em-
ployment rates is more than 20% in Italy, Ireland, Japan, and Spain. Italy has
the highest difference between employment rates with the lowest female employment
rate, 40.72%. Japan has the highest male employment rate, 81.35%.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for employment rates by country
female employment rate male employment rate
Country mean sd mean sd obs
Australia 59.01 6.94 77.82 1.93 39
Austria 62.78 3.485 75.76 1.23 24
Belgium 48.87 7.495 67.61 1.02 35
Canada 63.05 6.23 75.84 1.99 40
Denmark 70.31 2.17 79.08 2.22 35
Finland 65.596 3.75 69.30 3.7 28
France 55.25 4.24 69.26 2 35
Germany 58.59 7.52 75.23 2.64 35
Ireland 48.17 11.18 69.95 4.7 35
Italy 40.72 5.41 69.07 2.71 35
Japan 57.1 4.026 81.35 .925 40
Netherlands 59.51 11.12 78 3.9 33
Portugal 58.06 4.31 73.17 4.33 32
Spain 42.25 10.61 66.99 4.926 32
Sweden 71.97 3.24 75.3 3.37 28
United Kingdom 62.72 4.4 76.62 1.71 35
United States 62.905 3.89 77.75 2.97 40
Total 57.86 10.57 74.18 5.25 581
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for female employment share in different
economic activities by country. I mainly focus on the highest and lowest female
employment shares; in public administration and construction. Female employment
share is larger than male employment share in public sector in all countries in the
sample, except from Japan with 49.39%. Sweden has the highest female employment
share in public administration with 72.09%. Construction is a male-dominated eco-
nomic activity, female employment share in construction is very low in all countries.
The highest female employment share in construction is in Germany with 12.46%.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for female employment share by country
in public administration in construction
Country mean sd mean sd obs
Australia 59.055 3.63 11.94 1.425 23
Austria 59.54 3.44 9.697 1.93 27
Belgium 61.43 2.356 6.99 1.17 18
Canada 63.26 2.12 10.92 .72 23
Denmark 68.53 .84 9.17 1.31 18
Finland 70.99 3.49 8.26 1.46 32
France 64.79 1.58 9.52 .46 18
Germany 61.93 2.02 12.46 .61 18
Ireland 63.5 4.33 4.915 .735 18
Italy 54.87 4.1 5.73 .46 18
Japan 49.39 3.1 15.1 .895 30
Netherlands 61.68 3.285 8.015 .896 18
Portugal 66.84 1.82 4.26 .61 18
Spain 56.13 5.73 4.02 1.665 26
Sweden 72.09 1.43 8.04 .88 27
United Kingdom 66.4 .7 10.19 1.04 18
United States 64.65 3.85 9.916 .46 27
Total 62.56 6.88 8.96 3.18 377
In addition to data sources above, I also use work-family policy indicators in my
estimations. I have data for work-family policy indicators from three sources. The
first one provides data for length of maternity, paternity, and parental leave; mater-
nity, paternity, and parental leave benefits, and enrollment of children in a publicly
supported formal child care or preschool (Irene Boeckmann; Budig and Misra, 2012).
These data are available at the cross country level. The second source includes ma-
ternity leave, parental leave, family allowances, early childhood care, family taxa-
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tion policies, healthcare and diversity indicators8. The third source, OECD Family
Database, also provides data for work-family policy indicators. For the purpose of
this paper, I use the ‘public policies for families and children’ data from OECD
Family Database.
2.4.3 Results
Contractionary and expansionary discretionary fiscal policies might have different
gender outcomes. My hypothesis is that while contractionary policy disproportion-
ately affects female employment, expansionary policy might have more benefits for
male employment. By using the narrative data set, I can test the effect of contrac-
tionary discretionary fiscal policy whereas a narrative data for expansionary policy
is not available to test this hypothesis. I report the impact of the size of fiscal con-
solidation, tax based fiscal consolidation, and spending based fiscal consolidation on
the ratio of female employment rates to male employment rates9.
The local projection for the benchmark specification is as follows. In this specifi-
cation, I include two-way fixed effects. There are 428 observations. Figure 2.1a and
Table 2.4 report the results for the cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolida-
tion.
8‘This dataset was created by Misra, Budig, Boeckmann, Moller, and Strader, with support from
grants (0600926, 0751505, and 1022183) from the National Science Foundation’.
9Results of regressions are presented in the tables in Appendix B.
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erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + µc + τt + εct (2.2)
When the size of the shock increases, the female employment rate decreases more
than the male employment rate. Results are statistically significant from 3rd to 6th
time horizons. In other words, fiscal consolidation has disproportionate effects on
women staring from the 3rd year to 6th year after the policy change. A 1 percentage
point increase in the measurement of fiscal contraction decreases the ratio er up to
0.534 percentage points. I include country specific time trends in addition to two-
way fixed effects in the following specification. I present the results in Figure 2.1b
and Table 2.5.
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + µc + τt + ηc + εct (2.3)
Results show that fiscal consolidation has a significant negative effect on the
ratio of female employment rate to male employment rate in the middle of this
8-year period, and results are robust to the country specific time trends. Fiscal
consolidation affects female employment rate disproportionately starting from 3 years
after the policy until 5 or 6 years after. In the rest of the analysis, I use only two-way
fixed effect to increase degrees of freedom10.
10The results that are controlled for country-specific time trends are similar with few exceptions.
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Figure 2.1: The cumulative impact of fiscal consolidation on the female to male
employment rate ratio (without and with the interaction term)
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(a) with two-way fixed effects
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Table 2.4: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation, with two-way
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.092 -0.191 -0.295∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗ -0.319 -0.211
(0.143) (0.150) (0.149) (0.139) (0.156) (0.188) (0.197) (0.215)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation, with two-way
fixed effects and interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.084 -0.171 -0.278∗∗ -0.457∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ -0.281 -0.165 -0.047
(0.111) (0.115) (0.124) (0.139) (0.156) (0.176) (0.165) (0.175)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The disproportionate effect on female employment rate can result from the effects
on both female and male employment rates. Thus, I examine the effects of fiscal con-
solidation on both female and male employment rates. The following specifications
test these impacts:
ferc,t+h − ferc,t = β1FCct + µc + τt + εct (2.4)
merc,t+h −merc,t = β1FCct + µc + τt + εct (2.5)
where fer is female employment rate and mer is male employment rate. Figure
2.2 shows the results11. While Figure 2.2a and 2.2b indicate impulse responses on
female and male employment rates respectively, Figure 2.2c compares the impact on
both employment rates. The effects of fiscal consolidation on female employment
rate are statistically significant at 1% level until 4 years after, and continues to be
11Tables that show the results are available in the Appendix A.
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significant in the following year. 1% point of GDP contraction decreases the female
employment rate by 0.65. Even though the negative effects are also significant for the
male employment rate, they are less significant and lower in size. Especially, after the
4th year the difference between the effects on female and male employment rates are
larger. Both employment rates are significantly affected from the fiscal consolidation
in the beginning of the 8-year period. The difference between the effects is driven by
the effect on female employment rate which is larger and statistically more significant.
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Figure 2.2: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation on female and
male employment rates, with two-way fixed effects
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Below, I present the effects of the size of tax based and spending based fiscal
consolidation on the ratio of female employment rate to male employment rate. The
local projections for tax based fiscal consolidation is
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1TFCct + µc + τt + εct (2.6)
where TFC shows the size of tax based fiscal consolidation. The local projections for
spending based fiscal consolidation is
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1SFCct + µc + τt + εct (2.7)
where SFC shows the size of spending based fiscal consolidation.
Figure 2.3 shows the cumulative impact of the size of tax based fiscal consoli-
dation and spending based fiscal consolidation. The coefficient for the size of fiscal
consolidation is not statistically significant in the 8-year period after the fiscal con-
solidation. When the fiscal consolidation is spending-based, the effects are more
significant in the middle of the 8-year period which is similar to the overall effect.
Specifically, spending based fiscal consolidation has a disproportionate effect on fe-
male employment rate from 3 years to 7 years after the fiscal policy change, and
1% point of GDP contraction decreases the ratio of employment rates up to %0.564
point. The results are consistent with the literature and the hypothesis. The dispro-
portionate effect is driven by spending-based fiscal consolidation. Budget cuts affect
public services more, which can be both a demand and a supply channel because
women both need and are employed in public services more.
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Figure 2.3: The cumulative impact of the size of tax-based and spending-based fiscal
consolidation on the female to male employment rate ratio
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2.4.4 Robustness checks
There are some other variables that can affect the relationship between fiscal
policies and the ratio of female to male employment rates; such as female labor force
participation rate, size of different economic activities or female employment share
by different economic activities. These indicators may represent the outcomes of
both demand and supply side factors. Results are robust to the inclusion of these
variables, and in fact in some cases it strengthens the magnitude or significance of
the results.
In the absence of comparable time-use data over the entire time period covered by
my analysis, I use female labor force participation rates as a control for labor supply
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effects. However, it is important to note that female labor force participation might
also reflect other factors such as demographics and higher education enrollment as
well as unpaid work. The labor force participation rate data comes from International
Labor Organization database of labor statistics. The new specification is:
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2FLFPRct + µc + τt + εct (2.8)
where FLFPR shows female labor force participation rate. Figure 2.4a shows the
effect of fiscal consolidation when we control for FLFPR. The effects are larger, and
statistically significant from the 3rd year to 7th year after fiscal consolidation.
Figure 2.4: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation on the female
to male employment rate ratio, robustness checks
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Fiscal consolidation may have distinct effects in countries with different sec-
toral structures. The following specification includes controls for the relative size
of branches of economic activity within the market economy. The unit of measure-
ment is as a percentage of GDP, and the dataset has variables for gross value added in
agriculture, service and industry 12. To avoid colinearity, I only include two variables;
gross value added in agriculture and services.
Gross value added in each economic activity data comes from the OECD National
Accounts Statistics database. The specification is as follows:
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2i
∑
i
EAict + µc + τt + εct (2.9)
where EA shows the default category for gross value added in each economic ac-
tivity. Figure 2.4b shows the effect of fiscal consolidation, controlled for the size of
agriculture and service. The results are robust, and fiscal consolidation has a dis-
proportionate impact on female employment between 3rd and 7th year after fiscal
consolidation, which is similar when we control for FLFPR.
Further econometric specifications include female employment shares by different
economic activity as additional controls. Female employment share as a percentage of
total employment in each economic activity data is based on the author’s calculation
from the data constructed from the International Labor Office (ILO), employment by
sex and economic activity database. The shortcoming of this extension of the basic
12It is also possible to include subcategories of these economic activities, and present a more
detailed variety of economic activities.
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specification is that the number of observations does not allow to run the regression
with time fixed effects. Thus, I only include country fixed effects to increase degrees
of freedom in the following specifications. I present four options for econometric
specifications below.
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2fsharePUBct + µc + εct (2.10)
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2fshareAGRct + µc + εct (2.11)
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2i
∑
i
fshareict + µc + εct (2.12)
where fshare shows female employment share in each economic activity, i = PUB,AGR,CON .
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2i
∑
i
fshareict + µc + εct (2.13)
where fshare shows female employment share in each economic activity, and
i = PUB,AGR,CON,MAN,MEL,MKT 13.
Figure 2.5 shows the results of specifications that include female employment
shares in public sector; agriculture; agriculture, construction and public sector; and
13PUB: Public Administration, Community, Social and other services and activities, AGR: Agri-
culture, CON: Construction, MAN: Manufacturing, MEL: Mining and quarrying: Electricity, gas
and water supply, and MKT: Trade, transportation, accommodation, food BA services
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all available sectors respectively, in addition to size of fiscal consolidation and coun-
try fixed effects. Figure 2.5 a,b, and d show that when we control for the female
employment share by different economic activities, fiscal consolidation affects female
employment rates disproportionately for the entire 8-year period. Holding the female
employment share in different economic activities constant, the results suggest that
fiscal consolidation continues to have a disproportionate impact on female employ-
ment rate. Thus, broad changes in the structure of employment do not seem to be
driving the results.
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Figure 2.5: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation on the female to
male employment rate ratio, controlling for female employment share by economic
activity
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The empirical results show that fiscal consolidation, with a motivation of reducing
budget deficit, has a disproportionate impact on female employment rate in the 17
OECD countries included in this empirical analysis. The coefficients are especially
significant in the middle of the 8-year period examined here. The disproportionate
impact appears to be mainly driven by changes in female employment that are a re-
sponse to spending-based fiscal consolidation. The results are robust to the inclusion
of controls for specific demand and supply side factors. These include FLFPR, gross
value added and female employment shares in different economic activities.
2.4.5 Work-family policy indicators
As a further extension of the analysis, I control for the role of work-family policy
indicators. I gather work-family policy indicators (WFPIs) from the OECD Family
Database. I mainly focus on five indicators under ‘public policies for families and
children’ section. They mainly represent leave and childcare policies. I present
summary statistics for these indicators in Table 2.6. The number of observations for
each variable varies in the dataset. Among these five variables, only two of them
has enough data available for the analysis presented in this chapter. These are the
indicators of differences in family leave policies. Table 2.7 indicates the average
length of leave available to mothers and fathers by country. There is a variation
among the countries. United States and Australia do not have any leaves available
to mothers. Apart from these two countries, all other countries have at least 14
weeks of leaves available for mothers. Leaves for fathers are either not available or
they are very short compared to mothers. Austria has the highest average leaves for
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fathers with 9.75 weeks. Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, and the US do not
have any leaves available to fathers.
Table 2.6: Summary statistics for work-family policy indicators
obs mean sd min max
Total public social expenditure on families as a
% of GDP 80 2.51 .899 .9 4.2
Length of maternity and parental leave available
to mothers in weeks 544 35.66 36.76 0 161
Length of paid paternity and parental leave reserved
for fathers in weeks 544 2.017 5.238 0 28
Proportion of children aged 0-2 enrolled in
formal childcare and preschool 21 32.54 10.816 14.9 49.4
Proportion of children aged 3-5 enrolled in
preprimary education or primary school 11 86.73 12.893 66.3 100.1
N 544
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics for the length of maternity and parental leave available
to mothers, and paid paternity and parental leave reserved for fathers in weeks
available to mothers available to fathers
Country mean sd mean sd obs
Australia 0 0 0 0 32
Austria 79.5 19.535 9.75 12.355 32
Belgium 19.47 6.725 5.825 6.866 32
Canada 29.97 14.64 0 0 32
Denmark 37.94 16.814 6.75 8.48 32
Finland 133.31 51.203 2.53 2.724 32
France 20.875 10.31 .5 .88 32
Germany 64.94 30.068 .816 2.576 32
Ireland 14.69 6.088 0 0 32
Italy 47.7 0 0 0 32
Japan 35.5 22.87 0 0 32
Netherlands 15.31 5.245 .9125 4.654 32
Portugal 14.84375 3.34268 1.790625 3.996 32
Spain 15.31 .965 .547 .51 32
Sweden 55.965 6.804 4.425 3.76 32
United Kingdom 20.97 6.47 .44 .84 32
United States 0 0 0 0 32
Total 35.664 36.761 2.017 5.238 544
For the purpose of this study, it may be important to control the results for
WFPIs. Following Budig et al. (2012)’s approach, I believe especially two work-
family policy indicators can have significant effects on the female employment rate;
length of maternity and parental leave available to mothers in weeks, and proportion
of children aged 0-2 enrolled in formal childcare and preschool. For the former, data
is available for the whole period; however, for the latter, data is available for only
a few years and some countries. Therefore, I only focus on leave policies. I test
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several specifications below. In the first one, I only include the length of maternity
and parental leave available to mothers in weeks.
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2leavemct + µc + τt + εct (2.14)
where leavem shows the length of maternity and parental leave available to mothers
in weeks. Table 2.8 shows the results. Fiscal consolidation affects female employment
rate disproportionately from 3 years 6 years after the fiscal consolidation, and the
effect of the leave policy is not significant.
Table 2.8: Results with leave policies 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
FC -0.095 -0.194 -0.300∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗ -0.332 -0.227
(0.144) (0.151) (0.151) (0.142) (0.160) (0.193) (0.202) (0.220)
leave-mothers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Because leave policies may have a non-linear effect on women’s employment, in
the following specification I use a quadratic term for this indicator. Results are
similar to the previous specification, as shown in Table 2.9.
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2leavemct + β3leave2mct + µc + τt + εct (2.15)
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Table 2.9: Results with leave policies 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.097 -0.198 -0.304∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.324 -0.215
(0.144) (0.151) (0.150) (0.141) (0.159) (0.193) (0.203) (0.223)
leave-mothers -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
sq-leave-mothers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the final specification, I include the length of leave available to fathers in
addition to the length of leave available to mothers.
erc,t+h − erc,t = β1FCct + β2leavemct + β3leavefct + µc + τt + εct (2.16)
where leavef shows the length of paternity and parental leave available to fathers in
weeks. Results in Table 2.10 show that fiscal consolidation has a disproportionate
impact on female employment when controlled for the leaves available to mothers
and fathers.
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Table 2.10: Results with leave policies 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.123 -0.248∗ -0.357∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.353∗ -0.246
(0.138) (0.141) (0.141) (0.138) (0.159) (0.192) (0.201) (0.220)
leave-mothers 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
leave-fathers -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The impact of fiscal consolidation on the ratio of employment rates is robust
to the inclusion of controls for leave policies. In these regressions, the estimates of
coefficients on the leave policy variables are close to zero, and they are not statistically
significant (except from the last specification). The possible reason is that effects of
leave policies might be captured by fixed effects. To see if this is the case, I obtained
the fixed effects from the benchmark model. Fixed effects have a moderate correlation
with the length of leaves available for mothers (-0.3432), suggesting that the effects
of leave policies might be partially captured by fixed effects. Similarly, fixed effects
have a moderate correlation with the proportion of children aged 0-2 enrolled in
formal childcare and preschool (-0.3744). Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between
country fixed effects and these WFPIs (the length of leaves available for mothers,
and the proportion of children aged 0-2 enrolled in formal childcare and preschool).
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Figure 2.6: The relationship between fixed effects and WFPIs
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2.5 Conclusion
The narrative approach allows the analysis of fiscal consolidation, with a mo-
tivation of reducing budget deficits. The results presented here suggest that fiscal
consolidation disproportionately affects the female employment rate in the period of
3 years to 5/6 years after the policy change. The disproportionate effect is driven
by the effect on female employment rate. The results show that discretionary con-
tractionary fiscal policy usually decreases female employment rates more than male
employment rates or male employment rates recover faster than female employment
rates. Spending-based fiscal consolidation leads to a disproportionate impact on
female employment rate while tax-based consolidation does not have a significant
effect. Cuts in government expenditure affect female employment more. This effect
of spending-based fiscal consolidation is consistent with the literature.
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The results are robust when we control for FLFPR, and the size of economic
activities. When we keep female employment shares in different economic activi-
ties constant, fiscal consolidation affects female employment rate disproportionately
across the entire period. The effect is not driven by the female employment share in
broadly classified economic activity branches. Work-family policies affect the impact
of fiscal consolidation; however, there is not enough data to test different work-family
policies as a channel. Therefore, it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion regarding
the effects of work-family policies. ‘Can work-family policies explain the dispropor-
tionate impact of fiscal consolidation on female employment’? is a further research
question.
These findings suggest that the gender implications of fiscal policy choices may
change, depending on the policy. Policy makers should be aware of the fact that fiscal
consolidation decreases employment rates with a larger effect on female employment
rate, and the effects persist for several years. Contractionary macroeconomic policies
have negative employment outcomes in general but it also creates unequal outcomes
for women and men. Policy makers could address this inequality with other policies
that aim gender-equality.
There is need for more research on gender implications of fiscal policies. A further
research could address the impact of discretionary fiscal expansion on gender disag-
gregated employment rates because expansionary and contractionary policies can
affect different economic activities or they may have different effect on female labor
supply. Although, fiscal consolidation appears to have a disproportionate negative
impact on female employment for several years, the effect of fiscal expansion might
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be different than fiscal contraction. In addition, further research could investigate
the effect of fiscal policy on female time use for care work for a specific country or
several countries if the time use data is available and consistent among countries. In
further research, it will be useful to control for monetary policy choices when looking
at the impact of fiscal policy.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION REDUCTION POLICIES
ON FEMALE AND MALE EMPLOYMENT RATES
3.1 Introduction
For many central banks, maintaining price stability became the main target of
monetary policy, to the neglect of other targets such as employment creation. How-
ever, unemployment still remains an important problem, particularly with regard to
unequal labor market opportunities between men and women. Recent research has
shown that inflation reduction policies have disproportionate effects on women’s em-
ployment. This essay contributes to this literature by examining the dynamic effects
of inflation reduction policies on female and male employment rates, and the ratio
of employment rates up to 8 quarters.
In this essay, I examine whether inflation reduction policies had a disproportion-
ate impact on female employment in 23 European countries1 belonging to the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-Europe) between
1998-2018 by using a local projections methodology with quarterly country level
panel data. I use two empirical strategies. First, I look at the impact of short-term
1Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey
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interest rates, as a proxy for the monetary policy rate, on gender-disaggregated em-
ployment rates. Second, I analyze the changes in female and male employment rates,
and their ratio during inflation reduction episodes.
Results suggest that short-term interest rates, as a proxy for monetary policy rate,
have statistically significant negative impact on both female and male employment
rates. However, short-term interest rates do not have any statistically significant
gender effect on the ratio of employment rates. When we keep the female employ-
ment shares by broadly defined economic activities constant, findings suggest that
short term interest rates affect female employment rates disproportionately at the
end of this eight-quarter period. On the other hand, the impact of inflation reduction
episodes, on female and male employment rates, and on the ratio is not statistically
significant for majority of the period. The rest of this essay is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the findings of studies in the literature that have similar research
questions. In section 3, I discuss contractionary monetary policy and the gender dif-
ferences in the labor market and non-market work. Section 4 discusses the empirical
strategy, data, findings and a robustness check. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The impact of monetary policy on women’s employment is still a fairly new
research area for macroeconomics and feminist economics. The main research papers
on this field are Abell (1991); Braunstein and Heintz (2006); Takhtamanova and
Sierminska (2009); and Seguino and Heintz (2010). Although they do not ask the
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exact same questions, papers by Berument et al. (2005, 2008) are also related to this
research area.
Abell (1991) indicates that the distributional effects of monetary and fiscal policy
on unemployment are neither gender-neutral nor race-neutral. He focuses on the
periods 1974-1980, and 1980-1987 in the U.S. and uses a VAR methodology. He finds
that white males benefit more from the macroeconomic policy choices made. Based
on his results, black females were the other group that benefited significantly. Abell
(1991) explains this by black female’s higher educational achievement relative to their
male counterparts and businesses’ minority hiring plans. Because of polarized job
markets, racial and gender unemployment rates are not identical. Women, minorities
and youths are employed in less stable jobs than white males.
Braunstein and Heintz (2006) explore the linkages between monetary policies and
gender equality in employment outcomes in their research. They emphasize the dis-
proportione effects of inflation reduction on female employment. In addition, they
examine the question: ‘how are monetary policy indicators connected to gender-
specific employment effects’? They examine the relationship between inflation re-
duction policies and men and women’s formal employment for 51 ‘inflation reduction
periods’ between 1970 and 2003 in 17 low and middle-income countries. They ap-
ply a Hodrik-Prescott filter to the employment series in their estimation in order to
estimate the long-run employment trends. Their results show that contractionary
monetary policy has disproportionate negative effects on women’s employment. On
the other hand, maintaining a competitive exchange rate can help to reduce this
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impact. For non-contractionary monetary policy periods, they do not find a strong
relationship between policy instruments and women’s formal employment.
Takhtamanova and Sierminska (2009) investigate whether the policies for reduc-
ing inflation affect women’s unemployment disproportionately in nine OECD coun-
tries between 1980 and 2004, using quarterly data. Those countries are Canada, Fin-
land, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the US, and the UK. They use single
equation regression and vector autoregression analysis methodologies for economy-
wide, and sectoral analysis. They conclude that the link between the short-term in-
terest rate and employment is weak for the industrial countries that they researched,
and the impact of interest rates does not vary by gender.
Seguino and Heintz (2010) focus on the impacts of contractionary monetary policy
on gender and race in the US from 1979-2008. They use the federal funds rate, the
interest rate on overnight loans between banks, as the indicator of contractionary
monetary policy. In their paper, they examine the impact of the federal funds rate
on the relative unemployment rates of white and black women and men. According
to their results, monetary policy is neither gender nor race neutral. Unemployment,
as a result of contractionary monetary policy, affects black and white women more
negatively than white men. Moreover, black women experience a greater burden
than white women.
Berument et al. (2005) focus on the effects of the exogenous shifts in income and
monetary policy on overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate by differ-
ent levels of education by gender in Turkey for the period from 1988:01 to 2003:04.
Most of their findings are similar across gender. Exchange rates only affect total
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and female high school unemployment. Berument et al. (2008) look for the effects
of the indicators of macroeconomic policy shocks; real GDP, price level, exchange
rates, interbank interest rates, and the money supply on total unemployment and un-
employment by branch of economic activity for the period from 1988:01 to 2004:04
in Turkey. Their results show that the exchange rate and the interbank interest
rate innovations do not have any statistically significant effects on unemployment by
economic activity except for in manufacturing (both innovations have positive im-
pact) and finance-insurance sectors (only the exchange rate innovation has positive
impact).
The empirical literature therefore has still not reached a firm conclusion on the
existence of gender bias from contractionary monetary policy. While Braunstein and
Heintz (2006) finds this relation for low and middle income countries, and Seguino
and Heintz (2010) for the US; Takhtamanova and Sierminska (2009) cannot find a
strong relationship for nine OECD countries. The contribution of this paper is to
examine dynamic effects of inflation reduction policies on female and male employ-
ment rates, and investigate whether these policies have gender biases in terms of
employment outcomes for 23 OECD-Europe countries. In addition, I use two empir-
ical strategies to examine the impact of inflation reduction policies. The first one is
to look at the impact of short-term interest rate, a proxy for the policy interest rate
which is a tool of monetary policy. The second one is to identify inflation reduction
episodes, and look at the changes in gender-disaggregated employment rates in these
periods. My results do not provide consistent evidence that a gender bias exists,
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though I do find some confirmation in specifications controlling for sectoral female
employment shares.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
I discuss the conceptual framework for this essay in two subsections. The first one
discusses growth and employment outcomes of contractionary monetary policy. The
second subsection addresses gender differences in the economy, and possible channels
that can explain the gender bias of inflation reduction policies.
3.3.1 Contractionary Monetary Policy and Employment
Unemployment is a significant economic problem, and might lead to other eco-
nomic problems such as stagnant aggregate demand, output loss and greater inequal-
ity. Thus, reducing unemployment has been an important goal of macroeconomic
policies. As a part of macroeconomic policy, monetary policy, administered by central
banks, could also target employment creation. Moreover, many central banks in the
post-Second World War period conducted monetary policy to support development
policies(Epstein, 2007, p. 2).
However, since the 1980s, developmental outcomes or lowering unemployment
has not been the primary objective of monetary policies for a wide range of coun-
tries. Instead, reducing inflation became one of the most important goals. The main
policy goal of central banks of the countries adopting inflation targeting has been to
maintain price stability.
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In mid-1960s and 1970s, inflation emerged as a growing concern for many Western
economies (Sargent, 1982, p.41). Therefore, after this period, inflation reduction
policies gained prominence in a lot of countries. The first country that adopted
inflation targeting was New Zealand in 1990. Advocates of these policies argued
that high inflation causes long-run damage to real economic performance, so stable
growth and employment is consistent only with very low and stable inflation (Epstein
and Yeldan, 2008, p. 3). Because of the influence of these arguments, the primary
objective of monetary policy became maintaining price stability.
However, other economic problems are also as significant as inflation. Akyuz
(2006, p.46) (cited by Epstein and Yeldan, 2008, p.5) mentions that the main chal-
lenge of macroeconomic policy is unemployment and financial instability, not infla-
tion. Furthermore, stable inflation might not be dangerous unless it raises to very
high levels. Research suggests that inflation up to 20% does not create problems in
terms of growth, investment, foreign direct investments or other real variables (Ep-
stein, 2007, p. 7). These inflation reduction policies dominates other macroeconomic
goals, such as reducing unemployment or promoting growth. In this respect, unem-
ployment and informalization are the opportunity costs of lower inflation (Jayadev,
2009, p.75). Ball (1997) shows that the reason of rising unemployment during the
1980s is the tight monetary policy that aimed to lower inflation.
Inflation targeting policies have not been entirely successful. The main objec-
tives of these policies are to reduce the rate of inflation, to enhance the credibility of
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monetary policy, to reduce the sacrifice ratio2 associated with contractionary mone-
tary policy, and to help to attract foreign investment (Bernanke and others (1999),
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Roger and Stone (2005) (cited by Epstein,
2007, p.4)). However, inflation targeting could neither enhance the credibility of
monetary policy nor reduce the sacrifice ratio (Bernanke and others, 1999, and Ep-
stein, 2000, (cited by Epstein, 2007, p.4)). Tight monetary policy is used in order
to keep inflation in the low single digits, by using short-term interest rates as tool.
Contractionary monetary policy reduced the inflation rate; however, it did not result
in expected gains in economic growth or employment (p. 1-7 Epstein, 2007; Epstein
and Yeldan, 2008, p. 8). Epstein and Yeldan (2008) observe a rise in unemployment
for the post inflation-targeting period. In terms of the trade balance, there are coun-
tries that improved their trade surplus and countries that maintained large deficits.
After adopting inflation targeting, there was general trend towards exchange rate
appreciation for most countries caused by the expansion of foreign capital inflows.
In the inflation targeting regime, monetary policy focuses on ‘setting the policy
interest rate’. The exchange rate is left to the global financial markets, and a ‘float-
ing/flexible’ exchange rate system is implemented. According to the structuralist
macroeconomic tradition, it is important to have a stable and competitive real ex-
change rate because it influences employment and economy in general (Epstein and
Yeldan, 2008, p. 15-16). In my empirical analysis, I look at the different cases with
2Ball (1997) defines sacrifice ratio as the ratio of the loss in output to the fall in trend inflation.
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and without competitive exchange rates in order to see if it changes the impact of
inflation reduction policies on employment.
OECD European countries also follow inflation reduction policies. The European
Central Bank (ECB) applies a single monetary policy for every Eurozone member
country. These countries constitute a large part of my data sample. The primary
objective of ECB is to maintain price stability. The central banks of countries in the
rest of my sample also have the same primary goal. They are all inflation-targeting
countries. For example, for central banks of most countries (ECB and Sweden), the
target is below 2%, and for Iceland and Norway, it is below 2.5%. The exact target
rate differs among countries. Most countries decide the short-term interest rate (the
central bank policy rate) to achieve this purpose. However, Denmark maintains price
stability through both monetary and the exchange rate policy.
Similar to most of the world, OECD European countries also have a well-defined
separation between economic policy responsibilities. Central banks are responsible
for keeping the inflation rate low, and they are not directly responsible for other
policy targets. Although the ECB and the Central Bank of Czech Republic (CNB)
state that they support the general economic policies leading to sustainable growth,
full employment and balanced economic growth, the primary objectives of the ECB
and the CNB are still the same: maintaining price stability, which is hierarchically
privileged to other objectives.
In the Eurozone, each member country decides their fiscal policies even though
they are subject to the Maastricht Treaty; however, they follow the single monetary
policy applied by ECB. The Eurozone’s single monetary policy may not work iden-
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tically for all countries. This can result in unexpected or undesired consequences
for other economic objectives. These countries do not have the same policy space
available to them to use independent fiscal and monetary policies as macroeconomic
management tools.
Macroeconomic policies sometimes reflect the economic interests of particular so-
cial groups based on class, gender, or race. In other words, macroeconomic policies
have distributional effects. Resent research show that contractionary monetary pol-
icy has also distributional effects on different groups (Jayadev, 2009; Abell, 1991;
Seguino and Heintz, 2010). Workers are more influenced by negative impacts of
higher unemployment, and capitalists are more affected by higher inflation nega-
tively. Therefore, workers are unemployment averse while capitalists are inflation
averse (Jayadev, 2009, p. 72). Moreover, we can observe these different distribu-
tional effects in terms of race and gender. For example, black men and both black
and white women are disproportionately influenced by contractionary monetary pol-
icy in the United States (Abell, 1991; Seguino and Heintz, 2010). This paper also
aims to observe if there is such a distributional impact of inflation reduction policies
in terms of gender in 23 OECD-Europe countries.
3.3.2 Gender Aspect of Monetary Policy
There are several reasons that we would expect to observe gender differences
in economic outcomes. One of the explanations for the gender differences in the
economy is the sexual division of labor. The sexual division of labor both includes
the pattern of work allocation between women and men, and the social practices
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which classify some works as suitable for women but unsuitable for men, or suitable
for men but unsuitable for women (Elson, 1995b, p.3).
We can observe the gender inequality in the economy as the segregation of women
in specific occupations. In sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, women are primar-
ily employed in the agricultural sector as unpaid family workers. In other economies,
women are usually concentrated in the service sector (UN 2000:114, (cited by Elson,
2007, p. 5-6). The service sector is also segregated. Women work in community,
social and personal services, while men work in financial and business services. In
industry, women are primarily engaged in food processing, textile, and garment pro-
duction (ILO 2004: 12, (cited by Elson, 2007, p. 6)). Moreover, women tend to be
concentrated in informal work more than men.
Takhtamanova and Sierminska (2009, p.325-327) discuss the reasons that can
cause the different effects of interest rates on female and male unemployment rates.
The reasons they give are employment and occupational segregation, gender differ-
ences in labor market attachment, job tenure, and discrimination. They state that
empirical evidence shows that women and men work in different fields of employment,
and women work in a narrower range of occupations in the labor market. They have
different accesses to labor market attachment because of their different roles in the
care economy. Women are less likely to be employed full-time, and they have shorter
job tenure.
Employer preference is also a factor in gender discrimination. Employee’s and
employer’s preference can be interrelated. Because of employer’s reluctance to hire
women, women may not be motivated to compete with men in some occupations
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(Mandel and Semyonov, 2006, p. 1917). Employer’s preference may also cause
added-worker effect; women are usually considered as a source of cheap labor so
employers in labor-intensive sectors employ women to raise their profits.
Inflation reduction policies can affect some sectors more than others. This rela-
tionship can work through both interest rates and exchange rates. It is important to
test if female intensive sectors are more interest rate sensitive. If this is the case, infla-
tion reduction policies may affect female intensive sectors more through interest rate
channel. On the other hand, as Heintz (2006) mentions increasing the policy interest
rate can cause appreciation of real exchange rate. This can influence employment in
export sectors; and in many economies, women may be disproportionately employed
in labor-intensive, competitive export activities. Therefore, it is also possible that
contractionary monetary policy affects female employment through an exchange rate
channel.
Sectoral impacts are one part of the story. However, there can also be other
channels to explain this disproportionate impact on employment. Seguino and Heintz
(2010) make robustness check with education and sectors for their analysis. Even
though they find that education and sector also have effect on different unemployment
rates of women and men, the coefficient on the policy interest rate is still negative
and statistically significant. Women are usually employed in the precarious forms of
employment, and in case of an economic downturn, they tend to be discharged first
(Seguino and Heintz, 2010, p.1). There can also be additional channels to explain
this relationship. In the empirical part, I perform a robustness check with the female
employment shares in broadly defined economic activity branches to test if labor
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market segregation has any role in the distinct effects of inflation reduction policies
on female and male employment rates.
Economic downturns are usually not gender neutral. This gender impact of eco-
nomic downturns are apparent in various ways. Recessions can generate a discouraged-
worker effect or an added-worker effect for women. Economic downturns can occur as
a result of economic crises, austerity policies, budget cuts, or contractionary mone-
tary policy. This essay focuses on inflation reduction policies. The type of policy can
also determine the gender specific effects; discouraged-worker effect or added-worker
effect.
Macroeconomic policy changes may have direct effects on female paid employ-
ment, but they may also have indirect effects on unpaid work through the change
in paid employment. Increases in paid employment may increase the bargaining
power of women within households so their unpaid work time can decreases. On the
other hand, sometimes unpaid work is not influenced by the change in paid employ-
ment rates. In these cases, increases in paid employment may increase the burden
of women by raising total work time. Although more research is required about
impacts on both the paid employment and unpaid work of women, in this essay I
focus on paid employment because data is available to look at gender disaggregated
differences over time in contrast to data on unpaid work.
As discussed in the model of the first essay, there are different channels of macroe-
conomic policies that can yield differential employment outcomes for men and women.
The model presents three of them. First, women are usually employed in the labor-
intensive sectors so aggregate demand shocks might affect them more than the em-
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ployees in other sectors. Second, capacity utilization in female and male-dominated
sectors might respond to aggregate demand shocks differently. The sector, in which
capacity utilization responds to aggregate demand shocks more, would be affected
more. The last channel in the model is that female employment can be affected
through the burden of unpaid work, which is harder to empirically test for the cross-
country analysis. Depending on the response of capacity utilization in male and
female-dominated sector, these channels might have similar or different gender bi-
ases. If capacity utilization in male dominated sectors reacts to monetary policy
shocks more, the overall effect might be uncertain.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Methodology
I use Jorda (2005)’s local projections technique to estimate dynamic effects of in-
flation reduction policies on gender disaggregated employment rates. As I mentioned
in the previous chapter, this method has some advantages as a flexible method to
estimate dynamic effects. I use quarterly panel data for 23 OECD-European coun-
tries between 1998-2018. The fixed effect panel data approach allows to have time
and country fixed effects so I can compare different structured countries.
In this paper, I have two empirical strategies to examine the impacts of inflation
reduction policies on female and male employment rates separately, and on the ratio
of female to male employment rates. The first strategy is to look at the impact of
short-term interest rates as a proxy for policy interest rates. Policy makers increase
the policy interest rate to reduce inflation. Short-term interest rates are endogenous
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to some macroeconomic variables. To avoid this problem, I include lagged versions
of several control variables; GDP growth, inflation, and real effective exchange rate.
I try several specifications with these variables. There are some limitations to this
strategy. The control variables might not be enough to account for all endogeneity.
The second strategy is to identify the inflation reduction periods. I apply the
following methodology to decide the periods for policy application. Following the
methodology of Ball (1994), and Braunstein and Heintz (2006), I identify the defla-
tionary periods in each country, and then I examine if these periods are a response
to a monetary policy instrument. However, there are some small differences in the
calculation of these episodes. Inflation data is derived from consumer prices for
all items, and it shows the percentage change on the same period of the previous
year. I use moving averages of consumer prices to obtain trend inflation. I take
the average of seven quarters; including the three previous quarters and the three
subsequent quarters. Similar to Ball (1994)’s identification, a peak exists if its value
is higher than the previous four quarters’ and the following four quarters’ trend in-
flation, and a trough exists if its value is lower than four quarters’ trend inflation
on each side. The deflationary periods are identified by the periods between peaks
and troughs. Moreover, the deflationary episodes should be large enough (mostly at
least two points depending on the standard deviation of the trend inflation in each
country). If there is an increase in the short-term interest rate before these periods, I
label these periods as inflation reduction episodes, and use it as the dummy variable
for the main independent variable in the analysis. I specify 57 periods as inflation
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reduction episodes for 23 countries. Table 3.1 shows identified inflation reduction
episodes.
Table 3.1: Inflation Reduction Episodes
Country Inflation Reduction Episodes
Austria 2001q2-2003q2, 2008q2-2009q4, 2012q1-2015q4
Belgium 2001q3-2003q2, 2008q3-2009q4, 2011q4-2014q3
Czech Republic 2008q2-2010q1
Denmark 2000q3-2004q3, 2008q4-2009q4, 2011q3-2015q4
Estonia 2001q3-2003q2, 2008q2-2009q4 , 2011q4-2015q3
Finland 2001q1-2004q2, 2008q2-2009q4, 2012q1-2015q4
France 2008q2-2009q4, 2012q1-2015q3
Germany 2008q1-2009q4, 2012q2-2015q4
Greece 2008q2-2009q2, 2011q1-2014q3
Hungary 2004q2-2005q4, 2007q4-2011q1, 2012q2-2014q4
Iceland 2009q2-2011q2, 2012q3-2015q3
Ireland 2001q1-2004q3, 2007q4-2009q4, 2012q1-2015q3
Italy 2008q2-2009q4, 2012q2-2015q4
Luxembourg 2008q2-2009q3, 2012q1-2015q3
Netherlands 2002q1-2004q4, 2008q4-2010q1, 2013q1-2015q4)
Norway 2000q4-2004q3, 2009q1-2012q2
Poland 2005q1-2006q2, 2009q1-2010q1, 2012q1-2015q4
Portugal 2001q4-2004q4, 2006q4-2009q3, 2012q1-2014q2
Slovak Republic 1999q4-2002q2, 2004q1-2005q4, 2008q3-2010q1, 2012q2-2015q4
Slovenia 2008q2-2010q1, 2012q4-2015q2
Spain 2008q2-2009q4, 2012q1-2015q3
Sweden 2008q2-2009q4, 2011q3-2014q4
Turkey 2008q2- 2010q2, 2012q4-2013q2
If the country is in an inflation reduction episode, I assign a value of 1 to the
variable, and 0 otherwise. I use the dummy variable for inflation reduction episodes as
the main independent variable. This approach is relevant because it makes it easier to
compare the inflation reduction episodes to other periods, and it can provide a better
understanding of implications of the policy instrument. However, the variable that
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represents inflation reduction episodes might still correlate with other macroeconomic
variables. Thus, I control the results for the inclusion of GDP growth and REER in
addition to presenting the raw effects of inflation reduction episodes.
3.4.2 Data
I use quarterly data for the period from 1998 to 2018 for 23 OECD-European
countries3. Because data is not available for the whole period, I perform an unbal-
anced country-level panel data analysis. My data sources are mainly the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) datasets and the International
Labor Organization (ILO) datasets. For employment rates of women and men, in-
flation, short-term interest rates, real effective exchange rate, and GDP growth; I
prefer OECD Short-Term Labor Market Statistics, OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors (Consumer Prices), OECD Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI),
OECD Economic Outlook, and OECD National Accounts Statistics, respectively. In
the OECD data, the employment rate is calculated as the ratio of the employed to
the working age population. Real effective exchange rate represents countries’ price
competitiveness, and is expressed as national currency per US dollar. In addition, I
calculate female employment share in broad economic activity categories from quar-
terly ILO data for employment by sex and economic activity, seasonally adjusted.
There are a total of 1,606 observations across all variables4.
3Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey
4Summary statistics for variables is available in the appendix.
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Figure 3.1 shows the average female and male employment rates for each country.
Iceland has the highest average employment rates. While Turkey has the lowest av-
erage female employment rate, Poland has the lowest average male employment rate.
Male employment rates are higher than female employment rates in all countries.
Figure 3.1: Average female and male employment rates (as a percentage) by country
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Figure 3.2 presents the average female employment share in different economic
activities by country. In general, women’s share of paid employment is highest in
the public sector, and lowest in construction. There are exceptions, such as Turkey
and Luxembourg. In Turkey, the average female employment share is the highest
in agriculture. In Luxembourg, the lowest average female employment share is in
mining. Except from public sector and a few countries in trade, average female
employment share is lower than male employment share.
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Figure 3.2: Average female employment share in different economic activities by
country
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3.4.3 Results
3.4.3.1 The impact of short-term interest rates on employment rates
In this section, I present the results for my analysis of the impact of short-
term interest rates on female and male employment rates. Policy makers take other
macroeconomic indicators into account when determining the policy rate, so it is
not independent from these indicators. Thus, the results need to be controlled for
inclusion of these macroeconomic variables. Specifications in this section includes
the following control variables: GDP growth, real effective exchange rate (REER),
and inflation. I assume that these control variables are predetermined and include
them with a one quarter lag. The benchmark specification is as follows:
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erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β4hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(1a)
where i represents short-term interest rates, µ is country fixed effects, τ is time fixed
effects, and ε is the error term. er stands for the ratio of employment rates (female
to male), and erc,t+h − erct shows the accumulated change from time t to t+h. β1h
shows the impulse response in horizon h. The horizon is defined in terms of the
number of quarters after a change in short-term interest rates. Table 3.2 shows the
results. After controlling for the macroeconomic variables, the results suggest that
changes in the short-term interest rate do not have any gender effect on the ratio of
employment rates.
Table 3.2: The impact of short-term interest rates on the ratio of employment rates
(f/m)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
interestrate 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L.gdpgrowth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.REER 0.008 0.013∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
L.inflation 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The following specifications examine the impacts on each set of employment rates
separately; specification 1b estimates the effect on female employment rates while
specification 1c does the same for male employment rates.
ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β4hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(1b)
where ferc,t+h − ferct shows the accumulated change from time t to t+h for female
employment rates. Table 3.3 shows the estimated coefficients based on this speci-
fication. The impact of short-term interest rates on female employment rates are
statistically significant at 1% level. 1% increase in the short-term interest rates leads
to a 0.09-0.251 decline in female employment rates. The size of negative impact
increases in each quarter. The specification with the accumulated change in male
employment rates as the dependent variable is:
merc,t+h −merct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β4hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(1c)
where merc,t+h −merct shows the accumulated change from time t to t+h for male
employment rates. Table 3.4 shows the estimates based on this specification. Short-
term interest rates have statistically significant negative effect on male employment
rates for the whole 8-quarter period similar in sign to female employment rates.
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Table 3.3: The impact of short-term interest rates on female employment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
interestrate -0.090∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) (0.046) (0.051) (0.056)
L.gdpgrowth 0.063∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036)
L.REER -0.393 -0.773 -1.060∗ -1.544∗∗ -2.031∗∗∗ -2.426∗∗∗ -2.752∗∗∗ -3.106∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.489) (0.549) (0.608) (0.696) (0.790) (0.854) (0.921)
L.CPI -0.021 -0.036 -0.059∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.043) (0.051) (0.059) (0.063)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.4: The impact of short-term interest rates on male employment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
interestrate -0.120∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.041) (0.052) (0.059) (0.067) (0.075) (0.082) (0.086)
L.gdpgrowth 0.091∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.077
(0.022) (0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.052) (0.055)
L.REER -1.244∗∗∗ -2.100∗∗∗ -3.034∗∗∗ -4.086∗∗∗ -5.092∗∗∗ -6.050∗∗∗ -7.083∗∗∗ -7.959∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.581) (0.717) (0.841) (0.967) (1.088) (1.192) (1.256)
L.CPI -0.050∗ -0.093∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.039) (0.051) (0.062) (0.075) (0.088) (0.096) (0.099)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.3 compares the estimated impact of short-term interest rates on female
and male employment rates. The red and blue curves show impulse response func-
tions for specification 1b and 1c. The horizontal axis indicates the quarters after the
change in the short-term interest rate, and the vertical axis indicates size of the im-
pulse response. The sizes of the impacts are similar in magnitude. While the impacts
on male employment rates are larger until the 6th quarter, the impacts on female
employment rates are larger afterwards. However, the difference is not statistically
significant.
Figure 3.3: The impact of short-term interest rates on female and male employment
rates
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Below, I present specifications with different combinations of control variables.
Figure 3.4 presents the impact of short-term interest rates on female and and male
employment rates, and the ratio of employment rates across all of the specifications.
Green areas on the figure show the 90% confidence intervals.
Specification 2 estimates the effect of short-term interest rates on the ratio of
employment rates, and on each employment rate by including the previous quarter’s
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GDP growth as a control variable.
erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (2a)
ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (2b)
merc,t+h −merct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (2c)
The second row of Figure 3.4 shows the estimated impact5. The impact of short-
term interest rates on female and male employment rates are statistically significant
at 1% level. 1% increase in short-term interest rates leads to up to 0.35 decline in
female employment rates, and up to 0.445 decline in male employment rates. The
negative effect gets larger in each quarter for both employment rates. However, the
effect on the ratio is not statistically significant except from the second and third
quarter after the change in the short-term interest rate. During second and third
quarters, the effect is positive, meaning that the decline in male employment rate is
larger than the decline in female employment rate.
Specification 3 has two control variables; lagged REER and GDP growth.
erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (3a)
5Detailed results are available in the appendix.
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ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(3b)
merc,t+h −merct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(3c)
The third row of Figure 3.4 presents the estimated impact of short-term interest
rates when controls are included for lagged REER and lagged GDP growth6. The
results are similar to the previous set of specifications. Overall size of the effects on
female and male employment rates are larger than the effects in the previous set of
specifications.
Specification 4 controls for the inclusion of GDP growth and inflation in the
previous quarter.
erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β3hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (4a)
erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β3hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (4b)
erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + β3hinflationc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (4c)
6Detailed results are available in the appendix.
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The impact of short-term interest rates is not statistically significant on the ratio
of employment rates (f/m). However, the negative impact on each employment rate
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Sizes of the effects are smaller than the
previous two sets of specifications.
The estimates across the different specifications yield similar results. A rise in
short-term interest rates, which are used to reflect inflation reduction policies, have
negative employment outcomes for both men and women but the results do not
suggest a strong gender effect. In two of the specifications (2 and 3), in the second
quarter, male employment rates are affected more.
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Figure 3.4: The impact of short-term interest rates on employment rates
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3.4.3.2 The impact of inflation reduction episodes on employment rates
In this section, I examine the impact of inflation reduction episodes on gender-
disaggregated employment rates, and the ratio of employment rates (f/m). The
first set of specifications (#5) attempts to examine the effect of inflation reduction
episodes on the ratio of employment rates (f/m), and on female and male employment
rates without any controls.
erc,t+h − erct = β1hDEc,t + µc + τt + εc,t (5a)
ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hDEc,t + µc + τt + εc,t (5b)
merc,t+h −merct = β1hDEc,t + µc + τt + εc,t (5c)
where DE represents inflation reduction episodes. The first row of Figure 3.6 shows
the estimated impulse responses for this specification7. Inflation reduction episodes
are presented as dummy variables. Therefore, the estimated negative effect suggests
that female employment rates decline in the presence of inflation reduction episodes.
The results indicate that female employment rates drop by 0.167-0.183 during second
and third quarters of the inflation reduction episode. Apart from this case, the
effects of inflation reduction episodes in these specifications, from 5a to 5c, are not
statistically significant.
7Detailed results are available in Appendix.
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The benchmark specifications in this section is as follows:
erc,t+h − erct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (6a)
ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (6b)
merc,t+h −merct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t (6c)
In this specification, I control the results for the inclusion of REER in the previ-
ous quarter. Tables 3.5,3.6,3.7 and the second row of Figure 3.6 report the results.
The estimated coefficients of inflation reduction episodes are not statistically signif-
icant for the ratio of employment rates or male employment rates. However, it has
significant negative impact on female employment rates until the 5th quarter after
the change.
Table 3.5: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on the ratio of employment
rates (f/m)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
DE -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
L.REER 0.006 0.009 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on female employment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
DE -0.120∗ -0.180∗ -0.199∗ -0.222∗ -0.242∗ -0.217 -0.198 -0.182
(0.072) (0.094) (0.111) (0.128) (0.146) (0.163) (0.178) (0.192)
L.REER -0.274 -0.584 -0.766 -1.160∗ -1.535∗∗ -1.807∗∗ -2.026∗∗ -2.275∗∗
(0.410) (0.504) (0.578) (0.663) (0.774) (0.885) (0.964) (1.026)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.7: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on male employment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
DE -0.136 -0.187 -0.207 -0.224 -0.231 -0.196 -0.197 -0.203
(0.091) (0.126) (0.156) (0.176) (0.195) (0.215) (0.232) (0.252)
L.REER -0.919∗ -1.538∗∗ -2.265∗∗∗ -3.059∗∗∗ -3.781∗∗∗ -4.483∗∗∗ -5.302∗∗∗ -6.032∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.634) (0.774) (0.896) (1.027) (1.157) (1.265) (1.343)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.5 compares the impulse response functions of two specifications (6b and
6c). Blue and red curves show the impact on male and female employment rates.
The impact of inflation reduction episodes on female and male employment rates are
similar. The difference is not statistically significant.
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Figure 3.5: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on female and male employ-
ment rates
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I control the results for the inclusion of the lag of REER and GDP growth in the
last set of specifications.
erc,t+h − erct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(7a)
ferc,t+h − ferct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(7b)
merc,t+h −merct = β1hDEc,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1 + µc + τt + εc,t
(7c)
The last row of the Figure 3.6 shows the estimated impact of inflation reduction
episodes on the ratio of employment rates (f/m), female employment rate, and male
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employment rate. The results are not statistically significant similar to the previous
specifications in this section. The possible explanation for this is that I do not make
any distinction between expansionary and contractionary inflation reduction periods
as Braunstein and Heintz (2006) did. The employment effects might be different in
these periods.
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Figure 3.6: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on employment rates
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3.4.3.3 Robustness check
In this section, I control the results for the inclusion of female employment share
in different branches of economic activity.
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erc,t+h − erct = β1hic,t + β2hREERc,t−1 + β3hgdpgrowthc,t−1+ (8)
β4hinflationc,t−1 + β5hfsharej,c,t + µc + τt + εc,t (3.1)
where fshare is the female employment share in different economic activity
branches. j represents these branches, and they are agriculture, construction, man-
ufacturing, mining, trade, and public sectors.
Figure 3.7 shows the impact of short-term interest rates on the ratio of employ-
ment rates8. The results suggest that 8 quarters after the change, inflation reduction
policies affect female employment rates more than male employment rates. A 1%
increase in the short-term interest rate leads to an 0.001 decline in the ratio of em-
ployment rates (f/m). If we isolate the effect of changes of female employment share
in broadly defined branches of economic activity, inflation reduction policies might
affect female employment rate more.
8Detailed results are available in the appendix.
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Figure 3.7: The impact of short-term interest rate on the ratio of employment rates
(f/m), additional controls for the female employment share in different economic
activities
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As I discuss in the model in the first chapter, there are different channels for
the effects of macroeconomic policies, and different channels lead to different gender
impacts. These different channels might offset each other’s effect. Results in this
section would support such a case. Before controlling for the female employment
shares, which might show a broadly categorized labor market segregation, there was
no clear evidence of a disproportionate impact on women relative to men; however,
with the inclusion of these control variables, the results suggest that there might
be a gender impact. When I keep shares of employment constant, an increase in
short-term interest rates affect female employment rates more starting from the 8th
quarter after the change.
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3.5 Conclusion
Inflation reduction policies that are represented by a change in short-term in-
terest rates in this paper have statistically significant impact on female and male
employment rates. An increase in short-term interest rates leads to a decline in both
employment rates. However, this paper does not provide any evidence on differential
gender impact. The difference between the effects on female and male employment
rates is very small, and not significant. The results estimated here suggest that infla-
tion reduction policies have a disproportionate impact on female employment rates
at the end of the eight-quarter period when it is controlled for female employment
shares in broadly defined economic activity branches. On the other hand, according
to the second empirical strategy, it is not clear if the inflation reduction episodes
have an effect on employment rates or any gender difference in the effects apart from
two specifications. According to findings of these specifications, inflation reduction
episodes have a negative impact on female employment rates in the beginning of the
eight-quarter period.
There are several channels through which inflation reduction policies could affect
gender-disaggregated employment rates although they are not all empirically tested
in this paper. Overall effects of these channels appear to be not significant; however,
when we isolate the effect of broadly defined labor market segregation, we estimate
a negative disproportionate impact on female employment rates eight quarters after
the policy change. This might possibly suggest that other channels have biased
toward female employment.
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There are several ways to extend the research question discussed here for further
research. The current empirical strategy has some limitations. To avoid these lim-
itations, the effects of monetary policies can be identified with other identification
strategies. Using a narrative data similar to the second essay might be an approach
to address these limitations. Another possible research is to look at the heterogeneity
among countries because different countries may experience different gender impacts
of inflation reduction policies based on some factors such as sectoral structures of
the countries, different work-family policies, business cycle or depending on whether
the country is a developing country. A further research can empirically estimate
various channels of monetary policies on labor market. These channels might lead
to different gender implications.
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CONCLUSION
The theoretical model and empirical analyses in this dissertation suggest that
fiscal and monetary policies can have distinct effects on female and male employment
rates. However, the effects may vary depending on the type of the policy and on
the structure of the market and non-market economies. Specifically, while fiscal
consolidation has a large disproportionate impact on female employment rates, the
evidence regarding the effects of monetary policy is less clear.
The channels through which fiscal and monetary policies affect employment rates
are not necessarily the same. Specifically, fiscal policies have a direct effect on the
public sector, while monetary policies have a more immediate effect on the private
sector. Because women’s employment share in the public sector is larger, we are
likely to find different gender effects. The empirical essays present different findings
for fiscal and monetary policies. Austerity policies have direct effects on women’s
paid work while monetary policies are more likely to have less direct effects.
Gender inequalities in the economy could determine how macroeconomic policies
affect gender-specific employment rates. The first essay draws attention to gender
inequalities in the following areas: labor market segregation, the gender division of
labor in the household, and labor supply dynamics. Through these channels, fiscal
and monetary policies have different impacts on female and male employment rates.
More specifically, the labor intensity of female-dominated sectors, different capacity
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utilization responses of female and male sectors to aggregate demand shocks, and
women’s unpaid work burden produce unequal effects of macroeconomic policies
on employment rates. The model’s findings suggest that overall effects of these
channels might be ambiguous, depending on the responsiveness of different sectors
to aggregate demand shocks, other in many cases we expect the female employment
is disproportionately affected from contractionary policies.
The first essay makes assumptions to emphasize the role of these channels. Re-
laxing these assumptions could change the size of these effects. However, as long
as these channels exist, macroeconomic policies are likely to affect female and male
paid work differently.
In reality, these areas of gender inequalities are more complicated than discussed
here. First, employment in most sectors is not completely segregated by gender. Even
though sectors can be female- or male- dominated, most sectors are to some extent
mixed-gender sectors. Second, in some households, men also take responsibility of
unpaid care work even if the empirical literature shows that, on average, women do
significantly more unpaid care work than men. Third, the effect of bargaining power
on female labor supply is more complicated. The bargaining power of men in the
household might have contradictory effects from the desire for both unpaid work of
women and income from women’s paid employment. Depending on other factors as
well, the impact of bargaining power on unpaid work might be ambiguous. Further
research could explore these areas by relaxing the current assumptions.
In the second and third essays, I apply cross-country analysis, and partially con-
trol for differences among countries using a range of control variables and fixed effects.
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The advantage of this approach is that with a wider range of data, I show that fiscal
consolidation has a disproportionate impact on women’s employment.
In the second essay, I address a possible endogeneity problem by using a data
derived with a narrative approach. The dataset identifies fiscal consolidations that
are only motivated by a desire to reduce budget deficit, so they are less likely to
be correlated with prospective economic conditions. Narrative data let me focus on
fiscal consolidation rather than other fiscal shocks. By using a cross-country analysis,
I show that regardless of the differences among countries, austerity policies have a
disproportionately negative impact on female employment 3-6 years after the policy
change.
The main channel that is widely discussed in the literature to explain the dis-
proportionate impact of fiscal policies on female employment rate is labor market
segregation. The model incorporates such a channel but the empirical analysis does
not provide evidence that broad labor market segregation is the primary channel
through which macroeconomic policy has distinct gender outcomes. In the second
essay, the results are robust to the inclusion of female employment shares in broadly
defined economic activity branches. However, labor market segregation might still
play a role if we look at the segregation in greater detail.
This essay shows that overall fiscal consolidation has a disproportionate impact
on female employment rate; and the impact is driven by spending-based fiscal consol-
idation rather than tax-based fiscal consolidation. Further research could point out
how budget cuts in different areas have different effects. Especially, cuts in spending
on care-related services may matter in explaining the effect on female employment
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rates. A dataset on childcare data would help to answer these questions. Free or
subsidized care can reduce the burden of unpaid care work for women, and this might
affect the results.
Using a proxy for the policy interest rate, i.e. short-term interest rates, the third
essay finds evidence suggesting that contractionary monetary policies decrease both
male and female employment rates; although the gender difference is not significant.
However, the short-term interest rate is not a perfect proxy for the policy interest
rate. Another estimation strategy could address the research question more accu-
rately by using a new dataset to identify the monetary policy; such as the daily
policy rate.
In the third essay, I was unable to find gender differences in the effect of monetary
policy on employment rates. However, this essay implies that different channels of
monetary policy might have different gender effects, and they can offset each other,
which is also discussed with respect to the model in the first essay.
Even though it is not discussed in the essay, changes in paid work time might
also reflect changes from full-time to part time, or vice versa (i.e. hours of work).
The model considers the paid and unpaid work in terms of the time that is spent
on them. This can be analyzed empirically as well. As well as people moving from
full-time to part-time, we can also observe the difference between losing a full-time
or a part-time job.
Another aspect that needs additional exploration is the degree of variation among
countries in the second and third essays. In the second essay, I control the results for
some of these differences. In the third essay, I only look at the female employment
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share in broadly defined economic activity branches. However, with more data it is
possible to point out further variation/heterogeneity such as on work family policies,
structure of expenditure on childcare and elder care. This further extension would
also clarify the role of work-family policies, and how these policies change the effect
of macroeconomic policies.
Another extension would be to look at the variation of the results based on educa-
tion. Women with low and high education might not experience similar consequences
of policy changes. Thus, it would be important to see if the results still hold after
controlling for low/high education level of women. The education level might change
the degree of the labor market segregation, and this might affect the results.
There is need for further research on both the theoretical and empirical aspects
of fiscal and monetary policies in order to better understand the underlying trans-
mission channels. This research can be extended to analyze the effects of different
macroeconomic policies by using gender-aware macroeconomic models. Such research
can help explain gender implications of macroeconomic questions on different labor
market outcomes and non-market work. The theoretical findings in the first essay
shed light on the impact on both paid and unpaid work of women, and how these
two types of work could affect each other. Even though empirical essays estimated
some of these effects there is need for more research that can empirically test the
implications of the model.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
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Table A.1: Definitions of Variables
Indicators
Variables Definitions
Y output
Yi market output in male and female sectors where i = m, f
Yh total non-market output
YT total market output
Li male and female employment where i = m, f
b labor-output ratio in male sector
c labor-output ratio in female sector
H maximum hours that can be divided to work for women
U minimum amount of work that household needs
UWT unpaid work time
Nf number of female workers
P price level
τ, θ mark-up rates for male and female sectors
wi nominal wage rate for male and female workers where i = m, f
ωi nominal wage rate for male and female workers where i = m, f
σi male and female sectors’ share of total market output where i = m, f
pii profit shares in male and female sectors where i = m, f
Ki capital stock in male and female sectors where i = m, f
ρ profit rate
R total profit
z capacity utilization
zi capacity utilization in male and female sectors where i = m, f
Y full capacity output
I investment
i investment divided by capital stock
S saving
s saving divided by capital stock
si workers’ and capital’s saving where i = w, pi
C consumption
T tax
G government expenditures
D government’s balanced budget
u output-capital ratio
n nominal interest rate
r real interest rate
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2: ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Table B.1: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation on female em-
ployment rate, with two-way fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
size -45.701∗∗∗ -60.515∗∗∗ -64.599∗∗∗ -65.143∗∗∗ -61.793∗∗ -41.658 -30.162 -15.655
(14.713) (20.102) (22.489) (22.496) (24.127) (26.897) (27.908) (29.885)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.2: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation on male employ-
ment rate, with two-way fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
size -48.808∗∗ -60.311∗∗ -57.301∗∗ -44.629∗ -36.352 -20.037 -9.288 2.238
(24.234) (27.836) (28.122) (26.302) (27.188) (29.113) (29.898) (30.522)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.3: The cumulative impact of the size of tax-based fiscal consolidation, with
two-way fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
sizetb -0.078 -0.304 -0.254 -0.329 -0.367 -0.205 -0.059 -0.132
(0.155) (0.233) (0.230) (0.240) (0.280) (0.320) (0.300) (0.298)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.4: The cumulative impact of the size of spending-based fiscal consolidation,
with two-way fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
sizesb -0.085 -0.144 -0.288∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗ -0.375∗∗ -0.226
(0.161) (0.154) (0.147) (0.121) (0.137) (0.170) (0.182) (0.214)
N 428 427 428 428 428 428 428 428
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.5: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation, with two-way
fixed effects and FLFPR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.122 -0.231 -0.342∗∗ -0.531∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗ -0.330∗∗ -0.229
(0.136) (0.145) (0.153) (0.145) (0.157) (0.173) (0.168) (0.170)
FLFPR 0.001∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.6: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation, with two-way
fixed effects and economic activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.125 -0.205 -0.343∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗ -0.202
(0.149) (0.159) (0.157) (0.140) (0.138) (0.153) (0.145) (0.154)
Agriculture -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Services 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 301 300 301 301 301 301 301 301
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.7: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation and female
employment share in public
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.444∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ -1.039∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ -0.825∗∗∗ -0.773∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.119) (0.129) (0.159) (0.162) (0.177) (0.184) (0.162)
fsharePUB -0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 294 276 259 242 224 207 189 171
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.8: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation and female
employment share in agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.390∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗ -0.311 -0.146
(0.088) (0.116) (0.142) (0.166) (0.181) (0.203) (0.204) (0.210)
fshareAGR -0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 379 361 344 327 309 292 274 256
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.9: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation and female
employment share in agriculture, public administration and construction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.381∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗ -0.925∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -0.675∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.118) (0.134) (0.165) (0.161) (0.165) (0.178) (0.147)
fsharePUB -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fshareCON 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
fshareAGR -0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 294 276 259 242 224 207 189 171
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.10: The cumulative impact of the size of fiscal consolidation and female
employment share in different economic activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
size -0.363∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗ -0.966∗∗∗ -0.858∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.104) (0.129) (0.163) (0.162) (0.167) (0.185) (0.143)
fsharePUB -0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fshareCON 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.003∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fshareAGR -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fshareMAN 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
fshareMEL -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fshareMKT -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 289 271 254 237 219 202 184 166
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 2: UNIT ROOT TESTS
I apply fisher type unit root test with augmented Dickey Fuller specifications
to each panel. I prefer fisher type unit root test because it can be used with an
unbalanced panel data. I present the test results for both sections on tables below.
The tables shows the p values of unit root tests.
Table C.1: P values for the unit root test
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ratio-er p<0.001 0.99 0.003 0.98
female-er 0.39 0.73 0.65 0.103
male-er p<0.001 0.143 p<0.001 p<0.001
female-lfpr p<0.001 0.008 p<0.001 p<0.001
agriculture p<0.001 0.42 p<0.001 0.48
service 0.13 0.76 p<0.001 p<0.001
industry 0.486 0.95 p<0.001 p<0.001
fshare-agr p<0.001 p<0.001 0.06 0.2
fshare-con p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 0.006
fshare-man 0.05 0.01 0.98 0.82
fshare-mel p<0.001 p<0.001 0.002 p<0.001
fshare-mkt 0.215 0.002 0.33 0.15
fshare-pub 0.996 0.37 1 0.01
Notes:(1):AR(1) process without a trend, no lags (2):AR(1) process with a trend,
no lags (3): AR(1) process without a trend, with an additional lagged difference
term, (4):AR(1) process with a trend, with an additional lagged difference term
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APPENDIX D
CHAPTER 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table D.1: Summary statistics
Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
interest rate 1606 2.82 3.038 -.777 19.683
female employment rate 1623 59.242 10.936 21.947 84.312
male employment rate 1623 71.782 6.172 56.241 90.045
REER 1623 .9965 .1042 .634 1.623
Inflation 1623 2.577 2.501 -6.128 17.084
gdpgrowth 1949 2.47 3.495 -17.533 29.09
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APPENDIX E
CHAPTER 3: ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR THE
IMPACT OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE
Table E.1: The impact of short-term interest rates on the ratio of employment rates
(f/m), controlling for the GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
interestrate 0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.gdpgrowth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.2: The impact of short-term interest rates on female employment rates,
controlling for the GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
interestrate -0.101∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.050)
L.gdpgrowth 0.064∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.3: The impact of short-term interest rates on male employment rates, con-
trolling for the GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
interestrate -0.147∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.034) (0.041) (0.048) (0.052) (0.056) (0.061) (0.067)
L.gdpgrowth 0.094∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.099
(0.022) (0.030) (0.038) (0.044) (0.049) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
149
Table E.4: The impact of short-term interest rates on the ratio of employment rates
(f/m), controlling for the GDP growth and REER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
interestrate 0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
L.gdpgrowth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.REER 0.007 0.011 0.016∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.5: The impact of short-term interest rates on female employment rates,
controlling for the GDP growth and REER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
interestrate -0.102∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.043) (0.048)
L.gdpgrowth 0.064∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038)
L.REER -0.298 -0.607 -0.790 -1.182∗∗ -1.545∗∗ -1.824∗∗ -2.049∗∗ -2.307∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.468) (0.519) (0.573) (0.658) (0.748) (0.807) (0.864)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
150
Table E.6: The impact of short-term interest rates on male employment rates, con-
trolling for the GDP growth and REER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
interestrate -0.150∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.042) (0.048) (0.051) (0.055) (0.060) (0.065)
L.gdpgrowth 0.093∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.096
(0.022) (0.029) (0.037) (0.044) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056) (0.061)
L.REER -1.013∗∗ -1.671∗∗∗ -2.418∗∗∗ -3.215∗∗∗ -3.932∗∗∗ -4.652∗∗∗ -5.485∗∗∗ -6.227∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.546) (0.662) (0.759) (0.864) (0.967) (1.052) (1.109)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.7: The impact of short-term interest rates on the ratio of employment rates
(f/m), controlling for the GDP growth and inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
interestrate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L.gdpgrowth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.CPI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.8: The impact of short-term interest rates on female employment rates,
controlling for the GDP growth and inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
interestrate -0.092∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.040) (0.045) (0.050) (0.056) (0.060)
L.gdpgrowth 0.063∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.037)
L.CPI -0.015 -0.026 -0.045 -0.058 -0.080∗ -0.101∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.140∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044) (0.052) (0.060) (0.063)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.9: The impact of short-term interest rates on male employment rates, con-
trolling for the GDP growth and inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
interestrate -0.127∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.041) (0.052) (0.060) (0.069) (0.079) (0.086) (0.092)
L.gdpgrowth 0.092∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.085
(0.022) (0.030) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050) (0.054) (0.058)
L.CPI -0.033 -0.065∗ -0.094∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.188∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.039) (0.051) (0.062) (0.074) (0.088) (0.096) (0.100)
N 1591 1567 1543 1519 1495 1471 1447 1423
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.10: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on the ratio of employment
rates (f/m), controls for female employment share in different economic activity
branches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
interestrate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fshareConstruction -0.028 -0.075∗∗ -0.053 -0.051 -0.070∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.050)
fshareAgriculture 0.015 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.026 0.009 0.012 0.028
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
fshareManufacturing 0.018 -0.017 -0.032 -0.075∗ -0.061 -0.048 -0.056 -0.081
(0.026) (0.030) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
fsharePublic -0.012 -0.046 -0.050 -0.078∗∗ -0.096∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.049) (0.054)
fshareMining -0.009 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.037∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
fshareTrade 0.028 0.038 0.048 0.072 0.090∗ 0.094∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.121∗
(0.032) (0.035) (0.040) (0.045) (0.048) (0.052) (0.058) (0.066)
L.gdpgrowth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.REER 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.014∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
L.CPI 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N 1061 1043 1026 1010 993 977 962 945
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX F
CHAPTER 3: ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR THE
IMPACT OF INFLATION REDUCTION EPISODES
Table F.1: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on the ratio of employment
rates (f/m), raw effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
DE -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table F.2: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on female employment rates,
raw effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
DE -0.114 -0.167∗ -0.183∗ -0.198 -0.210 -0.179 -0.155 -0.134
(0.070) (0.093) (0.110) (0.127) (0.144) (0.161) (0.176) (0.191)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table F.3: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on male employment rates,
raw effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
DE -0.117 -0.154 -0.160 -0.161 -0.152 -0.101 -0.084 -0.074
(0.088) (0.123) (0.153) (0.175) (0.195) (0.215) (0.232) (0.252)
N 1607 1583 1559 1535 1511 1487 1463 1439
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table F.4: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on the ratio of employment
rates (f/m), controlling for REER and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4 ratio5 ratio6 ratio7 ratio8
DE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
L.REER 0.006 0.009 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
L.gdpgrowth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1607 1584 1571 1536 1512 1489 1475 1441
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table F.5: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on female employment rates,
controlling for REER and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fer1 fer2 fer3 fer4 fer5 fer6 fer7 fer8
DE -0.025 -0.054 -0.044 -0.051 -0.059 -0.026 -0.009 -0.000
(0.068) (0.087) (0.101) (0.115) (0.132) (0.149) (0.163) (0.179)
L.REER -0.232 -0.494 -0.672 -1.019 -1.366∗ -1.602∗ -1.833∗ -2.095∗∗
(0.403) (0.499) (0.556) (0.650) (0.766) (0.878) (0.948) (1.026)
L.gdpgr 0.071∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.038)
N 1607 1584 1571 1536 1512 1489 1475 1441
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table F.6: The impact of inflation reduction episodes on male employment rates,
controlling for REER and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mer1 mer2 mer3 mer4 mer5 mer6 mer7 mer8
DE 0.005 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 -0.011 0.014 -0.008 -0.030
(0.088) (0.121) (0.145) (0.163) (0.180) (0.199) (0.216) (0.240)
L.REER -0.856∗ -1.450∗∗ -2.145∗∗∗ -2.922∗∗∗ -3.612∗∗∗ -4.354∗∗∗ -5.146∗∗∗ -5.970∗∗∗
(0.452) (0.594) (0.701) (0.842) (0.987) (1.120) (1.213) (1.309)
L.gdpgr 0.105∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.040) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056) (0.060)
N 1607 1584 1571 1536 1512 1489 1475 1441
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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